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MINUTES OF EVIDENCE
TAKEN BEFORE THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS
MONDAY 4 NOVEMBER 2002
Members present:
Mr Edward Leigh, in the Chair
Mr Richard Bacon Mr George Osborne
Mr Ian Davidson Mr David Rendel
Angela Eagle Mr Gerry Steinberg
Mr Frank Field Jon Trickett
Mr George Howarth Mr Alan Williams
Mr Brian Jenkins
Sir John Bourn KCB, Comptroller and Auditor General, further examined.
Mr Brian Glicksman, Treasury OYcer of Accounts, HM Treasury, further examined.
Correspondence from Mr Ivan Lewis MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Adult Learning and
Skills, to the Chairman of the Committee
Individual Learning Accounts
1. I am writing to let you know the decisions we have taken on the future of the Individual Learning
Accounts (ILA) programme.
2. The Government remains committed to the original principles and vision of the ILA scheme. It put
power into the hands of learners to decide what and where to learn.Much was achieved in the original scheme
which we want to build on and extend.
3. In the light of experience of the original scheme, we have been considering carefully our future approach
to ILAs, and in particular how ILAs can best integrate within the wider review of the funding of adult learning
which was announced in the July 2002 Spending Review.
4. After careful examination, we have decided that it would not make sense to go ahead with full design
and implementation of the new ILA scheme in isolation from that wider review. We must ensure that the
successor programme is fully integratedwithin decisions about the future approach to funding adult learning.
It is appropriate to announce the details of the successor scheme as an integral part of that strategy.
5. The reviewwill be completed, and its conclusions set out, in the groundbreaking national Skills Strategy
and delivery plan to be published in June 2003. Having made this decision it is now appropriate to proceed
on a diVerent basis in taking forward the ILA successor scheme.
6. I enclose the press statement which we are issuing today announcing this decision. (Annex A)
7. In the light of this decision, we have reached an agreement with Capita that our work with them on
the successor programme is now complete, and it is sensible to terminate our current contract for the ILA
programme. Capita will continue to provide further support to us on the wind down of the original ILA
programme.
8. Given your Committee’s previous interest in the ILA programme and our work with Capita, I should
conﬁrm that the work that Capita colleagues have done with us on the initial development of a successor
scheme has helped to provide us with a framework on which we can now move forward and we are grateful
for the partnership approach that Capita have adopted to the wind-down of the original ILA programme
and the development of a successor scheme.
Ivan Lewis
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State
for Adult Learning and Skills
24 October 2002
Annex A
Responding to the National Audit OYce Report on Individual Learning Accounts Department for
Education and Skills spokesperson said:
“This is an important report from the National Audit OYce (NAO). It is clear that mistakes were
made and lessons have been learned.
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We remain committed to the principles of the Individual Learning Account (ILA) scheme. As the
NAO Report says, this was an innovative programme which helped hundreds of thousands of
people get back into learning. But as soon as the Department became aware of the potential for
serious fraud we acted on police advice and closed the programme down immediately.
The NAO Report will play an important part in helping us to ensure that the successor scheme is
robust and builds on the successes of the original programme, ensuring that the failures of the ﬁrst
scheme are not repeated.
The Government is developing a groundbreaking new National Skills Strategy. Central to this is a
fundamental review of the way adult learning is funded in this country. The aim of this review is to
ensure that the £2 billion spent on adult learning every year is used to maximum eVect.
After careful examination, we have decided that it would not make sense to go ahead with the full
design and implementation of the new ILA scheme in isolation from that wider review. We must
ensure that the successor programme is fully integrated within decisions about our future approach
to funding adult learning. It will therefore be appropriate to announce the details of the successor
scheme as an integral part of that strategy.
The review will be completed, and its conclusions set out, in the Skills Strategy and delivery plan to
be published in June 2003.Havingmade this decision, it is now appropriate to proceed on a diVerent
basis in taking forward the ILA successor scheme. As such, we have agreed with Capita that our
joint work with them on the development of a successor scheme is now complete. We are grateful
for the partnership approach that Capita have adopted to the wind down of the ILA scheme and
the development of a successor scheme.
The National Skills Strategy gives us a once in a generation opportunity to ensure the provision of
education and training is aligned to the skills needs of our economy. The principles underpinning
ILAs will be a key element in supporting the achievement of this objective.”
REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL:
Individual Learning Accounts (HC1235)
Examination of Witnesses
Mr David Normington CB, Permanent Secretary, and Mr Peter Lauener, Director, Learning Delivery
and Standards Group, Department for Education and Skills; Mr Rod Aldridge OBE, Executive
Chairman, and Mr John Tizard, Director, Policy and Public AVairs, Capita Group plc, examined.
(Mr Normington) The purpose of the scheme wasChairman
to encourage people of all sorts to learn. There were,
as the report points out, groups within that who were
target groups and actually the marketing was1. Good afternoon. Welcome to the Public
targeted on those. Those included young peopleAccounts Committee, where we have an interesting
without qualiﬁcations who are 19-30; peoplesession ahead of us on individual learning accounts.
returning to the labour market; people in small ﬁrmsBefore I start could I please welcome Mr Beukman,
who is the Chairman of the South African Public and so on, but it was not just the aim to reach those
Accounts Committee whom I had great pleasure in groups. The aim was to encourage more people to
meeting earlier today. Mr Beukman is very welcome come back into learning.
and is very interested in how we do things coming
from a fellow Commonwealth Parliament, of course, 2. And was there any monitoring at an early stage
and we also welcome Mr Bacon, who is deputy of who was joining the scheme?
speaker of the Tasmanian Assembly, as we welcome (Mr Normington) There was no monitoring early
everybody who is attending today. Today we are on —
considering the report by the Comptroller and
Auditor General on the accounts. We welcome Mr 3. Exactly —
David Normington and Mr Peter Lauener from the (Mr Normington) There were some follow-up
Department of Education and Skills, and Mr surveys done as the scheme progressed but there was
Rodney Aldridge and Mr John Tizard from Capita. no monitoring of people coming into the scheme.
Thank you for coming this afternoon. Perhaps I
could just ask a few questions to start with to Mr 4. On the risk management, secondly, you spent
Normington.What struck me from this report is that two years developing the scheme and a number of
a large number of those doing this training had pilot schemes, and we see that in report card 1,
degree level qualiﬁcations, and there are doubts paragraph 2.23.While having had these schemes that
about the amount of learning that actually took clearly were not working, did you implement a
place. Why did you not target speciﬁc groups and completely diVerent national model very quickly and
collect more data on results? with inadequate risk assessment?
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(Mr Normington) Yes. I think that is a very fair cases; only 99 have been referred to the police; only
one has been prosecuted. The scheme has been closedcriticism. It was the case that what had been piloted
was not implemented. What we learned from the down for a year now. Why is everything taking so
long?pilots was that it was very diYcult to get people to
take up the scheme in many circumstances, and also (MrNormington) Just to correct that, we now have
that there were serious problems in what I might call 151 learning providers in the serious case; 99 are in
the savings account model involving the banks, and front of the police; there have been 60 arrests; 11
ultimately the ﬁnancial institutions would not charged; ten court appearances are awaiting; ten
participate, and at that point at the end of 1999 there other people have been cautioned—why is it taking
was a signiﬁcant change of direction. It is a critical so long? It is taking so long because these are fraud
moment; there should have been a pause; it should cases and collecting the evidence and collecting the
have been replanned and was not. information, ﬁnding the evidence that there was
fraud, is proving quite complicated and time-5. And you were up against a timetable? consuming. I am afraid it is going to go on for quite
(Mr Normington) We were up against a manifesto some time. Getting the evidence that convinces the
commitment. police and the Crown Prosecution Service that there
should be prosecutions is also taking time as well. I6. Which was inﬂuencing your decision?
would like it to go faster.(Mr Normington) There was a manifesto
commitment to deliver a million accounts by 2002.1 10. What is the highest level of fraud that
somebody might have got away with? The ﬁgure of7. On monitoring, then, we are now into the
up to £2 million has been given to me. Is that beyondscheme and it is up and running, why did you wait
the bounds of credibility?until April 2001 to recognise that take-up was
(Mr Normington) I do not know. I really do not. Irunning way ahead of expectations? If you look at
think that we could be dealing with some tens ofpage 26 you will see a sudden blip, a lot more interest
million pounds of fraud here. I do not know how itin the scheme, and there were activity reports coming
breaks down into individual cases. I do not supposefromCapita to you.Why did you not spot something
it is beyond the bounds of possibility that £2 millionunusual was happening?
could be there but I simply do not know. The way(Mr Normington) I am afraid we thought that we
that this could happen, of course, is you have to havehad a success story on our hands. That was patently
a very high volume of trainers multiplied by quitenot true, but that is what we thought. We thought we
small amounts ofmoney, so it takes a long time to gethad found the way of stimulating a lot of interest in
to £2 million.learning, so we were not concerned at that point that
there were a lot of people coming into the scheme. 11. They had these logarithms going and they
My ﬁrst brieﬁng when I took up this job was, “We could run straight through these programmes and a
have a success story on our hands. For the ﬁrst time mass of accounts very quickly, could they not?
we have managed to reach a lot of learners“. I think (Mr Normington) In the last week they were
there is a serious problem about management running computer programmes for 24 hours trying to
information which is reﬂected in the report, but I get into a lot of individual learning accounts so they
think if you had looked at the management could draw the money out of it.
information available in April, you would not have
12. And we know that 40 per cent of the peopleconcluded from that that the scheme was running
who signed on to this scheme got no training at all,away. You would have concluded we had a success
do we not, but a lot of these may be completelystory.
fraudulent.
8. But surely you must have thought something (Mr Normington) A lot of that money was not
was a bit ﬁshy when you had sudden surges, maybe spent. It is not the case that when you signed on to the
up to 10,000 people coming on to the scheme in a scheme you immediately had to cash in the learning.
month. Did not that ring a few warning bells? There was always going to be a time lag. You took
(MrNormington) I think it should have done. You your account out and then you could pre-book
will hear me say a lot today that this was a bad learning over the next six months, so the fact that
story—it is a story of inadequate monitoring and not there was a gap between signing on and actually
picking up the signals. I think there ought to have cashing in the learning does not mean to say that that
been much better monitoring of those sorts of blips. learning was not there and was not provided. There
People were very focused on getting to the million were 1.4 million people who did learning under the
and believed we would have a lot of trouble getting scheme.
to the million, and that coloured the whole risk
13. So in the light of all this, what lessons have youassessment. A lot of the risks that were being
learned about your contracting arrangements for themanaged were the risks that it would not happen, not
future? About spelling out security arrangements,the risks that it needed to be turned oV. That was
requirements for management information, andentirely wrong as it turned out.
exception reports, for instance?
9. Thank you for being honest with us. It is always (Mr Normington) We have learned all those
good when people come on this Committee and say lessons. Our project management was not good
“mea culpa“ straight away but we still have to go on enough, our contract and supplier management was
asking our questions! You are still investigating 133 not good enough, our management information and
getting that focused on the exceptions was not good
enough, and we have learnt a lot about our relations1Note by witness: The manifesto commitment was to deliver a
million accounts within the lifetime of the Parliament. with Capita. I say again to you, this is a very bad
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story, I am quite ashamed of it and I am quite 18. You heard Mr Normington being very
apologetic for this. What is your view? Does theashamed of it on behalf of the Department. I am very
sorry for it too, and we have to put it right. blame lie with the Department, yourself, or is it to be
shared between you?
14. Thank you for that. Was one of the reasons (Mr Aldridge) The NAO report concludes quite a
that there was too much of arm’s length relationship number of things about the whole scheme. What I
between you and Capita? Perhaps if there had been would say is that I wanted to be involved with this
a closer partnership, things might have gone better? because quite passionately I believe in education. I
They were trying to warn you, or were they not? believe in everything that was trying to be achieved—
(Mr Normington) Mr Aldridge will speak for developing a training, provide an environment, and
himself. I think they probably should have shouted also encouraging life-long learning—so I am
louder at us at various points. I think that the enormously disappointed and saddened by the
relationship was one of us being the contractor and outcome of this. I feel that, as we will gather from the
they being the supplier. It was not a partnership: we conversations we will have, there were things that
did not sit together on a partnership project board could have been done and things that have to be
and therefore we were not sharing a discussion about learned from this.
what was happening with the scheme. We were
asking Capita to do things—they did things. They 19. And there are minimal things you should do in
sent us management information. There was not the future in your relationship with the
enough sharing of that so in that sense I think we Department—security, unusual patterns of activity
have learnt quite a lot of things about how you run and all that we saw in this scheme?
these sorts of partnerships. (Mr Aldridge) Of course, a lot of that information
was there—it was how it was interpreted and used,
15. Just one last question toMrAldridge: howwas and a lot of that is around the relationship that we
it, when all your competitors said they could not do have with the Department, particularly with the
this on time and it was not going to work, you alone project board.
decided to go ahead. Was it because you knew the Chairman: We will leave it now and ask Mr
risk lay with the Department and not yourself? Howarth to question further. Thank you very much.
(Mr Aldridge) When you go into bids like this you
do not know that you are the only bidder, and in fact
the process that starts is generally with a long list and
comes down to a few that were bidding. We chose to Mr Howarth
bid for this, and that is the other point to make. You
select what you want to bid for. You do not 20. Could I ask Mr Normington, the Report itself
necessarily go into it withoutmaking that choice. The in paragraph 3.20, page 33 refers to the fact that as
reasons that we went into it were that we had the long as ago as December 2000 there were concerns
infrastructure that could meet a lot of the within the Department that there was indeed some
requirements of the scheme; we had good working ﬂaw. Could you perhaps explain what took place
relationships with the Department; we have a very between then and the scale of the scheme being
good track record of implementing contracts and uncovered?
projects in a very speedy way. For example, we (Mr Normington) Yes. There were two cases in
implemented throughout the country the theory December 2000 and one of them was a case of very
driving test whichwe set up in sixmonths, 150 outlets aggressivemarketing of the scheme and the otherwas
around the country, 1000 people recruited, an IT about IT courses and whether they qualiﬁed for the
system designed, and it all went well. We set up for 80% discount or not. Both those providers were
the Department for Work and Pensions the winter investigated and they were suspended from the
fuel payments which involved 2.7 million people — scheme for a time. I have been back over this: I am
not sure they told us enough about what was going
16. We are not interested in anything else. If you to happen and what subsequently happened. They
could now answer my question. At the end of the day showed that there were two providers who were
you knew the risk lay with the Department. trying to make money out of the scheme. We looked
(Mr Aldridge) The contract, the discussions that at that and we did not think that was replicated
then evolved—we were not aware, if I may say, that across the rest of the scheme at that point.
we were the only bidder. What we were aware of was
the risk 21. Looking back on it now, was there a pattern
that you could have discerned then that you missed?
17. But if you got the contract, the risk lay with the (Mr Normington) I do not know about a pattern
Department? but clearly one of the providers was doing very
(Mr Aldridge) The way the contract was aggressive marketing of the scheme which was
negotiated, and it is not uncommon with any something that became a feature of the scheme later
contract, you look at what the risk and rewards are, on, the following year. I think we should have
you take risks where you can reasonably expect to spotted that earlier. I think the other one, as I recall,
control the things around you that are going to was a speciﬁc issue about the nature of the IT courses
trigger those risks; where you cannot, then you say that qualiﬁed for the discount, and that was sorted.
we are not prepared to take that risk, and thatwas the
sense of the conversations that went on in the 22. Perhaps you could explain to me the diVerence
between aggressive marketing and some other kindcontract.We did not set out believing that everything
was going to be a risk with the Department. That is of marketing? I thought by deﬁnition all marketing
was aggressive.not the way we —
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(Mr Normington) Not necessarily. I think quite an ambitious programme to have undertaken.
At what point did the scale of those claims startaggressive marketing—and there are some examples
of this in the report—is pursuing people at hospital alarm bells ringing?
fetes, and I think that is one of the examples given (MrNormington) Too late, is the answer. It should
there, and saying things like, “If you give us your have happened much earlier—
name and address and sign up here we will make a
27. Clearly that is the case!contribution to the hospital”. I think that is not for
(Mr Normington) Well, everything you can sayme marketing learning; that is aggressive marketing
about this scheme was too late, I am afraid. There isof a scheme which is going to make somebody
a chart in the report which shows that we should havemoney, so I think you can draw distinctions. It is
spottedmuch earlier that there were these 20 or so bigbasically, later on, the people who were standing in
providers and we did not do that until well into theVictoria Street trying to persuade people to sign up,
summer, and we should have spotted that at least sixand what that was about was trying to collect
months earlier. Now that information was available:learners’ individual addresses rather than trying to
it was being provided: but a lot of information wasget them interested in training.
being provided and that was not picked up. It is an
23. So that was not anything to do with aggressive obvious thing to do—to look at the big providers and
marketing then—that was simply to do with getting to check them. That should have been done and
names and addresses so they couldmake false claims? was not.
(MrNormington) So they couldmake claims, yes. I
do not want to get hooked on the word “aggressive”. 28. Why was it not done?
People were being stopped in the street, being oVered (Mr Normington) It just was not done because the
mobile phones or CDROMs, and some of it was very way in which the project was being run meant that it
persistent. was not in the risk assessment that that was likely to
be a risk to the scheme.24. Something like 2.5 million accounts were
opened, and we had some of these statistics a 29. So what you are saying is that it was a failure of
moment ago, of which 1.5 were used, but paragraph the system rather than somebody just forgot to do it?
1.5 suggests that a quarter of learners, some 400,000 (Mr Normington) Well, it was not that somebody
people, were registered as having started their forgot to do it. It was a failure of the whole
courses but had not done so. What steps are being processing system, yes.
taken, and where has it got to, to determine how
many of the accountswere used by bona ﬁde learners? 30. In retrospect, again, what do you think should
(Mr Normington) Where we can we are doing a have been done for that not to have happened?
major follow-up of learners. This is why it has taken (Mr Normington) I think that there should have
such time. We are doing major mailshots to ﬁnd out been much greater attention to the kind of
whether they had the learning or not and what kind management information you needed to test whether
of learning.We are also visiting all the providers who this scheme was meeting its objectives or not, and
are under suspicion and although it is 151 serious also what risks were arising in the scheme. It is clear
ones, there are another 400, or just over 400, who are tome that, if there are a number of providers who are
also being followed up. All those people are being very big claimers of money, you ought to be focusing
followed up in one way or another and their records in on those. One of the problems is that the risk
are being looked at and checked against the assessment for too long assumed that the risk of
individuals’ names on Capita’s system, so there is a fraud was not high, and therefore it followed from
huge follow-up going on and we will not rest until we that decision that not enough action was put in place
have completed that.2 to test whether fraud was happening. It was very
late—well, relatively late—the scheme only ran for25. Can you give us some idea of how long you
just over a year but relatively late in the processexpect that to take before it is completed?
before the risk of fraud was moved up the agenda.(Mr Normington) I think before we know the full
That was a mistake and it was made right at thescale of the fraud, ie the end of the process, it will be
beginning.two years.We are though, ourselves, clearing some of
these cases.We have just written to 150 providers, on 31. Finally from me, paragraph 3.19 on page 331 October, where we think there are questions to be refers to further analysis you are undertaking intoanswered and where we are seeking recovery of the companies under investigation to identify whethermoney. We think that it is short of serious fraud but any links can be made with others previouslywhere money has been paid to them improperly or involved with fraud and abuse. Could you tell us (a)inappropriately and we are seeking recovery of that. why you think it is important to do that, and (b) whatSo there are diVerent levels of action going on. progress you have made on that?
26. One of the things, obviously, thatmust have set (Mr Normington) Obviously there is a lot of
alarm bells ringingwas the scale of some of the claims training and learning being done around the system
beingmade by providers. Looking at the information and it is important that those companies are not
in the report, paragraph 2.51, 20 have received over popping up in other places in the system. What we
£1.5 million and two have received over £6 million. have been doing is cross-checking with the Learning
These are large sums of money and, given the fact and Skills Council, who have been doing some
that a lot of them would be very locally based, if they checking with the providers that have signed up with
had been carrying out the work it would have been it, and there is also some cross-checking backwards
to the kind of people who did business with the
2Note by witness: We are following-up 472 providers. Further Education Funding Council and so on. So
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we are trying to check in all the places in our You set up a system which was driven by fraudulent
programmes where these providers might be training providers in their own interest, and therewas
providing training. a positive ﬁnancial incentive for them to do so which
is why you got a couple of examples of over 30,00032. Is this the organisations you are looking at, or
accounts being registered to individual trainingthe individuals within the organisations?
providers, and thirteen of 10,000 each. Absurd!(MrNormington) That is a good question. I hope it
(Mr Normington) I do not think all of thoseis both but I do not know precisely. It should be both
providers were fraudulent, nor all of those individualbecause obviously these people—and this is one of
claims. We have no evidence of that. But, yes, thethe issues—trade under diVerent names; they change
original decision was the wrong decision. It meanttheir names and change the names of the companies.
that a lot of incentives were in the system to(Mr Lauener) Coming in on that point, we are
encourage learning providers to go out there and tostarting with the organisations and the company
ﬁnd the trainees and to register them on the system.names that we on have on our records and cross-
That was a deliberate decision of policy designed tochecking, asMrNormington says, with the Learning
get a lot more people into the scheme than we hadand Skills Council database, with theUFI learndirect
ever done on previous schemes, and it does ﬂow fromdatabase, and with other providers within the group
a belief that this was going to be a market drivenof organisations connected with our own
department. I also convened a meeting with more
35. Including virtual people?government departments back inAugust as a prelude
(Mr Normington) Well, some. It was driven by ato doing the same with more government
belief that this was going to be a market drivendepartments. We are just getting our data in a form
scheme and that the individual learners would judgewhere I can sensibly share it. The next stage is the one
whether that training was up to satisfactoryMr Normington has just referred to which is going
standards or not, and that they would not take up thebelow the level of the company to the directors that
training unless they wanted it and needed it, and thatare involved.We have not been able to do that yet but
was going to be the check on the scheme.we plan to.3
36. Did you or the Department seriously believe
when the scheme was designed that providers would
Angela Eagle not have that kind of incentive, and that learners—
because this was targeted at those with no33. How could you have been so deluded, because
qualiﬁcations although it was not only used by thoseyou have been deluded all the way through the
with no qualiﬁcations—that learners with noprocess—about it being a success, being obsessed
qualiﬁcations would have that power in any market?with the 1 million ﬁgure, actually designing a system
that is very easy to defraud, if you even spend a little (Mr Normington) That was the assumption made
bit of time thinking about it. at the time; I think it was the wrong one. I cannot
(Mr Normington) I think that is the right analysis, defend that as an assumption. A set of assumptions
in fact. I have gone over this in my mind and talked were made at the beginning that there should not be
to the people who were involved in developing the any checks on providers or on the individual beyond
policy. I did that again this morning because there absolutely rudimentary checks, and there should be
were some decisions which, with hindsight, seem very few checks on the learning that was undertaken.
inexplicable and I take responsibility for it but I was Those three decisions meant it was made as a very
not there dealing with this at the time decisions unregulated scheme and, with hindsight, it led to
were taken these problems.
Chairman: You know that is no excuse.
(Mr Normington) I do know that but I am just 37. With hindsight, yes, but if I saw a scheme that
explaining that I was not there, therefore I cannot tell was summed up in the way you have just summed it
you precisely what happened. I am reporting to you up for its assumptions I would hear alarm bells
what I think happened. What I think happened was ringing now, a priori, without having any experience
there was a belief that individuals would not come of it. It would immediately worry me that you were
into the scheme and that there needed to be a very setting up a system that would take on a life of its
light-touch, non bureaucratic system to get them into own, and eVectively signing a blank cheque to those
the scheme. There was also a speciﬁc policy aim of providers who are fraudulent and, as we know, there
bringing a lot more trainers or learning providers seem to be rather a lot of them.
into the scheme, and there was a very early (Mr Normington) There was a decision taken that
assumption that that would mean that there would this was going to be a schemewhich, for the ﬁrst time,
be a very limited set of checks and rules and did reach people who would not otherwise haveprocedures. So right at the beginning a series of learnt, and to do that you needed amuchwider rangedecisions were taken not to have checks. The decision of trainers and providers in the system than we hadnot to have checks on learning providers —
had up to now, and that was what led to there being
34. I was coming to that. No accreditation, no no checks on providers beyond some very basic ones,
validity checks on claims that were made and, in nor on individuals. Yes, with hindsight, that was the
eVect, an open door policy demand-led by the wrong decision.
providers not the learners. That is the issue, is it not?
38. Very well. How many learners were registered
without their knowledge—so-called learners?3Note by witness: This is subject to Data Protection Act
requirements. (Mr Normington) I am afraid I do not know that.
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39. And we have only got guesswork, which has (Mr Lauener) We are withholding in most of these
cases until we have reached a settlement. In the morebeen done I think by writing to samples of registered
people, about how many people had learning serious cases we referred them to the police, and in
those cases we are not contacting the providersexperiences—58%—and that must be done by survey
because you do not know, do you? directly because we do not want to contaminate the
evidence trail with the police but wewill in due course(Mr Normington) No, because we have had to do
and we will pursue, if we cannot reach a settlement,it by survey. I do not recognise the 58 % ﬁgure, but
outstanding cases in the courts.there are two issues here — 4
46. But it is highly likely that large numbers of40. It is somewhere in the Report.
these fraudulent activities will go unpunished really(Mr Normington) There are two issues. One is the
because of the sheer scale of it.number of people who signed up and howmany then
(Mr Normington) Possibly, but that is not whereconverted and did their learning, and the ﬁgures are
we start. What we are trying to do is follow up2.6 million signed up and over 1.4 million did the
actively everyone who has abused the system and welearning. That does notmean to say that the other 1.2
will not give up on that, but the scale of it means thatmillion were not prepared and ready to do their
it would be surprising if we caught everybody.learning because there was a time lag and thatwas the
design of the scheme between signing up and doing 47. Clearly. You have the rest of education to be
your training or learning. responsible for meanwhile. How much of the
Department’s resources are being used pursuing this41. But equally we do not know howmany of those
disaster, and trying to clear up the mess?people were signed up without their knowledge in
(Mr Normington) At the last count I had 70 staVorder simply to provide a payment for a fraudulent
working in this area and I have about 4,200 staV inprovider?
the Department as a whole.5(Mr Normington) No, we do not. May I ask my
colleague to ﬁll in? 48. Do you think you are giving it the right
(MrLauener) That is precisely the area we are now priority?
exploring by contacting large numbers of learners as (Mr Normington) I think I am, yes, and somebody
a basis for then pursuing any cases where providers is also helping the West Midlands police from the
have defrauded the public purse through the Department to pursue the worse cases more rapidly
programme. We have contacted some 50,000 than they would otherwise.
learners, 50,000 people registered on a database, to 49. Do you think it is fair to say that the trigger forask whether they received learning. the discovery of all of this was the fact that you
overspent the budget, £199 million, and that is what42. 50,000 out of 1.5 million, or 2.5 million?
set the alarm bells ringing, rather than the aggressive(Mr Lauener) Well, it is 50,000 out of those for
marketing that was going on and the deeply ﬂawedwhom learning claims have been drawn down.
scheme you put into place?
43. Yes, but you cannot go through all 2.5 million (Mr Normington) I think in the summer of 2001
people who registered presumably, so in eVect — when we began to realise there were serious
(Mr Lauener) No, we cannot. problems, ﬁrst it was a combination of the budget,
the number of complaints which, as you can see from44.—You are not going to knowwhere half of this
the report, started rising, and those complaints beingmoney went or what happened to it really, because
about the nature of the marketing and so on—it wasthere was nothing put in place to do validity checks
a combination of those things really. The thing thatand not enough information was collected because of
brought it to my attention was the budget overspendthe design of the scheme about what was going on
because I was really alarmed about that, but whenweout there?
then looked at it alongside the other evidence we had(Mr Lauener) We think we will have from the we saw there were problems growing in the scheme.sample of 50,000 an adequate basis on a statistical
sample for not just making a global estimate but for
making an estimate for the individual providers we
Mr Osbornehave concerns about. The number of learners we
have got has been chosen on that basis and we are in 50. Mr Normington, you said with admirable
the process now of writing to 158 providers. On 1 candour that it was a bad story, a story of inadequate
October we said, “On the basis of the information we monitoring, you are quite ashamed of it, you are very
have, we think that a proportion of the claims you sorry, and project management was not good
have made”—a proportion in these cases because enough. Who has resigned within the Department at
these are not the most serious cases—“are not valid”, an oYcial level as a result?
and we are making a proposition about how we can (Mr Normington) No one has resigned. The senior
settle the business between the departments and that management who were dealing with it are not
individual provider. working on this any more and two of them are
working outside the Department.45. So you are still paying them?
(MrNormington) On the whole we are withholding 51. What are they working on within the
Department?money, not paying it.
4Note by witness:This ﬁgure refers to the percentage of account 5Note by witness: This ﬁgure includes staV working on the
wind-down of ILAS, and also staV developing plans for aholders who had booked or undertaken learning before the
scheme closed on 23 November 2001. successor scheme.
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(Mr Normington) The two senior — 60. Even if they got a CD, at least they had not paid
for it?
52. How about the person who Mr Lauener (Mr Normington) Well, that is true. People startedreplaced, because I understand he is responsible for complaining about that. I do not think that wasthat division within the Department?
satisfactory, really. There are a lot of complaints(Mr Normington) He is working on—sorry—I — about that. There is a spectrum here from serious
fraud through abuse and irregularities to minor53. Come on. It is not that diYcult!
problems, and that is going to amount to improper(Mr Normington) Sorry—let me just say
payments of tens of millions of pounds. About half itsomething. I am not prepared in front of this
Committee to pillory my own staV. They did their we think, a bit more, is at this end, the fraud end. The
best; it was obviously not good enough, and I will other half is various types of poor value.
answer your question. The individual has been taken
61. Table 11 in this Report, page 25, includes someoV all the line responsibilities he had, and a job is
of the ineligible courses funded. These includebeing—he is moving to a job outside the
Trascendental Meditation, Exercise to Music—Department.
which I assume is keep ﬁt classes—North Star
54. A job is being designed for him? Crystals—whatever that is, Summer Glastonbury
(Mr Normington) It is a real job, and I am not 2001. Is there any prospect of retrieving a single
paying for it. pound of any of this money?
(MrNormington) I amnot going to defend that list.55. Because there is a genuine point here which is—
Of course the way that —and by coincidence the Secretary of State has
resigned and ministers are expected to take
62. It is more New Age than New Labour!responsibility for things that go wrong—that within
(Mr Normington) This is the weakness of thethe private sector if you were in charge of such a
scheme here. Let me just explain that one of thedisastrous project you might lose your job or the
problems here is that learning was properly funded ifcompanymight go under, butwithin the Civil Service
it was vocational and for a vocational purpose. Somethere is no real punishment, is there?
of the things in this list were for a vocational purpose.(Mr Normington) There is punishment short of
I am certainly not going to defend Summerdismissal. Sometimes people get dismissed for
Glastonbury. I thought I might defend Chronic Catsincompetence—that does happen. It has not
which is a very small one. That was for people whohappened in this case.
worked with vets in a veterinary practice and was
56. But is this not biggest case of incompetence you about ailments of cats.
have come across in your Civil Service career?
(MrNormington) It is a pretty bad case. It is about 63. Season ticket was just a season ticket, was it?
as bad as I have come across, yes. (Mr Normington) I am afraid I do not know that.
I have got a list of what they were; I am not going to57. You said you were investigating cases of actual
defend them. Some of this was inappropriatefraud, but could I just turn to the things which are not
learning.actual fraud in the sense of people inventing learners
who did not exist and so on, but just cases where you
64. You said in your answers to earlier questionsgot ripped oV, or the taxpayer did, with poor
to Angela Eagle that of course, with hindsight, therelearning, low value courses. That is a much larger
were all sorts of problems and so on. The interestingproblem?
thing about this report is that that defence is very(Mr Normington) Yes, that is a much larger
weak because you are consistently, as I read it,problem. The reason we stopped the scheme at the
warned ﬁrst of all by the Further Education Fundingend of September when we temporarily suspended
Council, by your pilot schemes, by Oakleynew providers and so on is we were much more
Consulting who you get in, and even by Capita itself,concerned about that at that point. A lot of the story
your partner in this, that there are particularhere is of the selling of training which amounted to
problems, particularly with not requiring qualityalmost nothing, either a CD ROM or access to a
assurances from providers. Why do those messageswebsite or —
fall on deaf ears in the Department?
58. For which they got £150 cheque from the (Mr Normington) There were some warnings—I
taxpayer? would not say they were as strong as you imply—but
(Mr Normington) For which the provider drew nevertheless there were people who raised this
down the money. A lot of what we call abuse here question. And the answer is: because it was a speciﬁc
is that. policy objective of this programme to bring lots of
(Mr Normington) Is there any way of estimating new people into the scheme from the private sector.
howmuchmoney was wasted rather than defrauded? It was thought a lot of themwould be very small; they
(Mr Normington) I cannot—because I do not would be niche providers of particular types of
know — training; and it was thought that that groupwould be
put oV by a highly bureaucratic and intrusive system59. What percentage of these schemes were,
of provider checks. When the scheme opened up,frankly, in your estimation not worth the money?
there transferred from the TECs and from the(Mr Normington) I hold on to one fact which is a
Further Education Funding Council over 2,000positive one which is that in our surveys, 91% of the
training providers who were properly registered andindividuals said they had value out of the learning
and actually had done learning that had beneﬁted— properly checked —
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65. And the TECs and the Further Education the scheme. Could we have done it earlier? I guess,
yes, we could. We did it pretty fast but the way theFunding Council said “We will tell you who those
are”, and they are good people? scheme at that point was running out of controlmade
it essential to close it.(Mr Normington) And they came into the scheme
and were checked and so on, but it was a deliberate
policy to go beyond that to try to stimulate this
market in training. It was the wrong decision. Jon Trickett
66.With theMarch 1999 budget which introduced 72. I want to try a diVerent line of questioning
the 80% discount, it says in this Report that no relating to contract management really. It seems to
research at all was carried out on how it might work me that maybe some of the problems went right back
in practice. Does the Treasury normally sign a blank to the beginning when the contract was let in the way
cheque when you come up with that idea? it was. There were nine original consortia interested
Chairman: Who is that question to? in bidding; you ended up with one. Did it not occur
Mr Osbourne: I could ask the Treasury I suppose. to the Department that Capita might be slightly rash
(Mr Glicksman) The decision in the budget was a in being the only one out of nine prepared to attempt
decision in principle for the Department to to deliver this, given the fact that, with all the others,
implement. The details would have been for the there was a unanimity of view that this was too fast
Department. This would have been a decision that a timescale to deliver?
was taken over a year before the scheme went live. (MrNormington)We did have quite a debate at the
time about whether we should do some things to67. So was it a Treasury decision or a Department
encourage more bidders to stay in the programmefor Education decision?
and of course we also set up, and this was what best(Mr Glicksman) Well, the decision was in the
practice said we should at the time, a public sectorbudget but it was done in consultation with the
comparator so we could test the cost eVectiveness ofDepartment.
the Capita bid. So we did consider that, but the
68. Finally, can I ask you, you said when you decision was then taken that Capita were a
arrived in your present job in the Department, which competent company and we should go with it. They
was in the spring of last year, you received a brieﬁng convinced us that they could run this system and they
from your deputy secretary saying “It is all going had a lot of experience with this type of system.
very well” and so on. When did you ﬁrst think 73. Paragraph 2.22 does talk about the publicpersonally, “Something has gone wrong here”? sector comparator and principally is concerned with(Mr Normington) Somewhere around the end of price. The fact is that allegedly the public sectorJune/early July because at that point the complaints comparator, which always seems to be the case,were going up and the budget overspend being turned out to be higher than the bid but it does seemprojected looked as though it was going up—the to me that, alongside price, there also has to be awhole demand for the scheme was going up—and at judgment about capacity to deliver a quality schemethat point I was worried and people began to say to for the price being bid and certainly in the privateme “There is a problem with this scheme”. sector, if you were letting a contract, you would
69. If you turn to table 13 on page 27, which is the attempt to get the lowest price but you would also
graph, you will see that between July when you ﬁrst ensure that the contract was capable of delivering
had your suspicions and when the scheme was what you wanted to be delivered. You referred to
actually suspended, a huge number of accounts and cost eVectiveness in your response to me. Is it not a
active accounts were open. If you had acted on your matter of regret maybe that you looked at price
suspicions immediately and wound down the scheme rather than other indices as well?
as quickly as possible, a huge amount of the fraud we (Mr Normington) We were looking at whether
have suVered as taxpayers would have been avoided. Capita could deliver against the speciﬁcation and at
Is that not the case? that point, or just before, we took on KPMG to be
(MrNormington) In retrospect that is so butwe did our professional advisers so we could test whether
take a lot of action from that point to try to stem the Capita could meet the speciﬁcations, so it was not
growth of the scheme. We suspended— just about price but also about the speciﬁcation being
set out.70. It had the reverse eVect though, of course?
(Mr Normington) Well, the ending of the £150 74. Are you satisﬁed that Capita delivered to the
incentive which happened at this time caused people quality which you required?
to look for other ways for other parts of the scheme (Mr Normington) Capita made some mistakes and
to start attacking, and that became apparent during it is certainly a fact that it was possible, once youwere
August and September. They went for the 80% in this system, to get access to individuals’ names and
discount bit of the scheme at that point particularly. addresses, so no, not wholly satisﬁed.
We did suspend providers at that point and we did 75. You are the second accounting oYcer in recentlater on stop issuing blank forms, because one of the weeks who has been in front of us who is reporting tothings that happened here was providers had blank us what eVectively was a single tender bid. I wonderforms and they could register lots of individuals– whether you feel that there is some problem with the
71. Which you gave them? Department convincing itself that it should accept a
single bid, because it is always possible to construct(Mr Normington) Which we gave them. We
stopped that; we made it a requirement that a theoretical model of a public sector comparator but
you are in a weak position in relation to the bidder,individuals should register directly—we did all those
things and growth continued upwards so we stopped are you not, once you are down to one?
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(Mr Normington) Yes. 81. Maybe the C&AG could advise us, not now, in
relation—
76. Whether or not the bidder knows they are the
only bidder, and Mr Aldridge is saying he did not
know he was the only bidder, you knew and it is clear
Chairmanin this document that you felt weak as a Department
in negotiating with him on it because of that? 82. What do you mean, “You do not know”?
(Mr Normington) Yes, and I would always prefer (MrNormington) I would have to go back and ﬁnd
to have more than one bidder because it leaves you out precisely what happened at the contracting point
with only one option. Either you go with the bidder on this point.
or you stop the scheme.
83. You can do a note for us, can you?
77. But you were under enormous pressure, (Mr Normington) I can.6
including the manifesto commitment to deliver?
(Mr Normington) Yes, we were, and that was the
choice really because if we had decided not to go with
Mr TrickettCapita, I do not think we would have delivered the
scheme on time. However, the reason for taking on 84. My line of questioning really stems from the
professional advisers and making sure that we had fact that here we had a not unusual process, whittling
very good professional advice and setting up the down from several people who appeared to be going
public sector comparator was to try to make sure to bid, down to one. The risk was not being
that, if we signed a contract with Capita, we could be transferred at all, or barely at all, into the private
sure that they would deliver, and that is what we sector which is allegedly the reason why we went for
believed. these PFI things, and yet no risk was then being
taken, or barely any risk, by the private sector. I78. I think the Committee needs to reﬂect on the would be interested to know whether the dice weresituation which we are being faced with, with people once again loaded against the public sector, and thatlike yourself coming here with single tender bidders was the point of my question. Why did thewhich then turn out not to deliver precisely what was Department incidentally refuse to have Capita on a
wanted. When it comes to the actual contract itself joint board or in a partnership relationship with
which you let to Capita, in paragraph 2.18 the them?
speciﬁcation, it says, made quite clear that the (Mr Normington) It was normal practice at thatassignment must be a risk-sharing partnership and time that you did not do that. It was a bit of theology
that therefore Capita were required to share the risk about how you had to separate the purchaser from
with yourselves. Elsewhere in the document we know the supplier I think, but in this kind of partnership
that other risk was laid upon the Department and where eVectively you are running this kind of scheme,
that therefore the bid which Capita made really in that is the wrong decision. You would not do that
practice as the contract evolved involved no risk now but that was quite routine in those days. In fact,
whatsoever on the part of Capita, or barely any. it was not normal to have the contractor on the
(MrNormington) I am not sure whether that is true project board.
but I accept the original intention was not carried
85. Paragraph 2.23 relates to this particular matterthrough. This was a straightforward contract and we
which I am questioning you about. There it says thattake responsibility for this. It did not, in practice,
there was a standard document provided by CCTA,share the risk with Capita. That is true.
who seem to be ubiquitous whenever we discuss this
79. The argument for PFI is always that the risk is matter, who were suggesting a particular form of
either spread or passed to the private sector. Here it relationship, but I just referred earlier to paragraph
is saying that the risk should be spread but the 2.18 which talked about risk sharing and a
document says in eVect the risk was not spread. Yet partnership. Now, both cannot be true. The
Capita’s bid, and I am asking you, Mr Normington, statement in paragraph 2.18 says that you as a
would have allowed a substantial amount of money Department speciﬁed a risk-sharing partnership, and
for the risk which they were being asked to take, yet you have just answered me that, in fact, the standard
they took no risk in the end? contract would exclude the possibility of a
(Mr Normington) I am not precisely sure that is partnership?
what then happened. What then happened was a (Mr Normington) It did not exclude it; it did not
much more straightforward contract for the supply explicitly carry it forward into the contract, I think.
of this system and service, and that is what we paid It did not set out to exclude it. We use the standard
for. I am not sure that the original intention was ever contract but we adapted it to this purpose to some
seriously carried through into the way in which the extent, obviously.
contract was developed. I do not know. I do not
86. I do not feel at all comfortable with the waythink it was.
departments generally, and yours in particular, let
contracts in these PFI relationships. I just want to80. Do you think that KPMG eliminated risk from
ask something on an entirely diVerent matter and gothat public sector comparator then? What you seem
back to the fraud which went on.My ownTEC inmyto be now saying is that Capita had no price in there
own home town seems to have been engaged or havefor risk because the risk was not spread to them,
contractors engaged in fraud—very similar activitiesreally?
(Mr Normington) I do not know. You would have
6 Ev 28to ask.
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to the ones going on here. Was there substantial (Mr Normington) Yes. We had not ever run
anything like this. This was a very diVerent kind ofexperience at the time of the TECs of this kind of
fraudulent activity by contractors? programme because of the way it used what became
the Capita system to link the individual and the(Mr Normington) There is always some fraud in
provider. We had not ever run anything like that andthis system but I do not think there was large scale
there was no way that the Department could providefraud in the system at this point. If there had been, we
that system itself once it had been decided to havewould have been more alert—
this kind of very innovative scheme. We then spent,87. The police were certainly into Wakeﬁeld TEC. as the report says, a substantial amount of time(Mr Normington) Yes, there were some examples trying to get an arrangement with the banks whichand examples of further education colleges at the would involve individuals setting up savingstime which are sort of referred to in the Report. accounts which—Nevertheless I do not think that this is a systemwhere
94. We will come on to that.large scale fraud is normal and therefore, when we
were setting up this programme, people did not (Mr Normington) I know, but a lot of time was
expect large scale fraud to happen in this spent developing that model, then quite late on that
programme. It is obvious they did not because they model was dropped because the banks did not want
did not set it up in this way. to be involved, and we moved on to something else.
That is when the point of timing and speed came into88. My experience of Wakeﬁeld TEC was that
it. But, with all this advice, everybody involved in thisthere was substantial fraud by learning providers,
was doing something for the ﬁrst time so althoughwetraining providers, and I wonder whether the
had lots of expertise we were dealing with somethingDepartment ought not to have been more aware that
that had not been tried before.that was going on up and down the country?
(Mr Normington) We would normally have been 95. So the advice and the expertise from outside
very aware of fraud in TECs. I am not aware of was not used?
that case. (Mr Normington) Yes—you can see that in some
cases it was not used properly and we did not take the
advice, but in other cases it was used. We certainly
Chairman did use the professional advice we had for setting up
this project, but insofar as there were warnings about89. If you are not aware, you can give us a note on
the risks, those warnings were not heeded.that as well, then.
(Mr Normington) Yes.7 96. Paragraph 2.16 in the Report refers to the
demand model you commissioned from KPMG, but
that you did not go on to develop a detailed business
Mr Jenkins model to evaluate associated costs and beneﬁts on
the national scheme including the impact of90. You have had some diYcult questions and I am
demand. Why?going to start oV with some nice easy ones. You said
(Mr Normington) First of all, the estimate that thein answer to the Chairman that it was a manifesto
scheme would exceed its million, which is what wascommitment to get 1 million learners by 2010?
said here, was not taken suYcient note of. It was not(Mr Normington) 2002.
believed that that would be the case. Secondly, there
91.Did youmean by that it was not a departmental was quite a lot of testing—indeed, there was a
commitment? development of a model of the scheme involving the
(Mr Normington) Manifesto commitments, when ﬁnancial institutions which was then dropped, and
the government is elected, become government then there was only partial testing of the system that
department commitments. followed.
92. So the Department was 110% behind this 97. I can see you were 100% committed to making
commitment? this a success, because at every stage of the way any
(Mr Normington) Yes. expert from outside or any information or any advice
was in the main ignored, and you carried on with the93. So why was your Department not data
scheme which had been planned for Mickey Mouse.processing the system in place to run this scheme
You are going to give freemoney away out there, andbecause you had not got the information? You did
you are surprised that people queue up to take it. Isay that your management team were not really able
went through this report generally looking for someto run this scheme and you took advice fromdiVerent
good news, and I thought, “There are thousandspeople. This is the risk assessment, and I notice you
upon thousands of fellow citizens who have anhad advice from the Further Education Funding
opportunity to take up a course that they may notCouncil and they warned you about this—that they
have taken up”, and I did search but I did not ﬁndhad been down this route before—and you ignored
much good news in there.that; and you had all the expertise of KPMG on
(MrNormington) I share that view, I did not either.board and Capita itself who had been working there.
However, the one thing I do not want you to takeWho made the decision that the risk was low? Was it
away from this is the belief that there were not a lotthe Department itself?
of people who did learning which they would not
otherwise have done and which brought them value.7 Note by witness: The DfES Special Investigation Unit (SIU)
There was a substantial number of people who didwere involved in the investigation of four providers who
that. Everything else you say about the bad news incontractedwithWakeﬁeldTEC.Conﬁdential note provided,
not printed. this report I agree with you about.
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98. I think it was Mr Trickett who said that the or the £175? In the survey if you said “Yes, I am
satisﬁed with the value for money, I got good valuepublic sector comparator which you always devise
for money” which ﬁgure do you use, the £25 ﬁgure?and develop came up with a cost of £60 million and
Capita’s bid came up with £55 million, so Capita (Mr Normington) No, the question which was
asked and which I referred to was “Did your learningcame out at £5 million cheaper. Is the contract with
under this scheme meet or exceed yourCapita still running?
expectations?” and 91% said it did. I am sorry, I(Mr Normington) Now?
misled you. It was not speciﬁcally a question about
99. Yes. value for money, it was about did it meet your
(Mr Normington) Yes, in a number of ways. We expectations.
decided just over a week ago that we would not move
105. £25 is not very much, £175 is quite a lot.immediately to a second scheme and we would
(MrNormington) They might have paid more thanterminate the present contract with Capita, so we are
that. It was a whole range of costs.having a discussion about that with them. But they
have been helping us since the ﬁrst scheme closed 106. In that one category I was looking at.
with the recovery of money, and with the pursuant (Mr Normington) Yes, £25 is not very much.fraud they have been putting resources of their own
into that. So we have been working very closely with 107. A couple of CDs and a book and I would be
them on that. We have to, because they have a lot of happy.
the details. (Mr Normington) As the scheme developed the
individual knew that they had the account with more
100. They have the details, the data, the systems money than that in, £150 or more, and they had to
and this inquiry is going to last for the next two years put in £25 in addition so they knew they had an
before it is fully run down, so Capita will be account and they could draw down the money from
extremely useful for the next two years? that account.
(Mr Normington) Probably not—
108. One of the things we have overlooked are the(Mr Aldridge) I think to be fair, a lot of the work
good providers out there, there are some genuinelythat we would have done is complete. I think from
good providers who got caught in this sting. Theirnow on, in terms of the two year period, we are very
money stopped, some of those have gone bankrupt.happy to help but it would be something which
Do you feel that in someway youmay have lost morewould be done within the Department.
jobs in this country than you have created as a(Mr Normington) Because we have all the records
Department via this scheme?and all the information.
(Mr Normington) There were 8,910 providers
101. So you do not need Capita any more? signed up with this scheme and we are pursuing
(Mr Normington) We are terminating the contract somewhere around 600/700 providers which is quite
with Capita. a small proportion but they were often the ones who
took a big amount of money out of the scheme. We102. So it is not going to cost us more than £55 know of 13 businesses which have actually gone outmillion? of business but we would not necessarily have total
(Mr Normington) It is not going to cost us more information about that because we did not contract
than £55 million. I am sorry—I cannot work out the them with ourselves. We know there were 13 ﬁrms
arithmetic for that.We are having a discussion about which went out of business since we closed the
the termination of the contract, and we have not paid scheme. They were often very, very small providers,
anything to Capita since last April and very little one person businesses and so on.
since a year ago, only limited amounts, so that will all
have to be taken into account.My colleague here tells
me it is likely to be quite a bit less than £55 million. I
did not want to say that to you unless I was sure, but Mr Steinberg
we have to have this discussion with Capita and we
109. I think you have got the Department oV theare having this discussion, and this is obviously a
hook this afternoon by your apologetic attitude tosettlement that we will have to reach.
the Committee which is very commendable because
we do not often get it. On the other hand I think you103. So we shall save some money there to oV-set
are getting away with murder, frankly, because Ithe other costs?
think this is absolute incompetence on the part of(Mr Normington) Well, I hope we will not pay the
your Department, which I think needs saying. Whatfull cost of the contract. Whether that is a saving I
is unforgivable is you were given advice and youthink is an interesting question really but, yes, we will
ignored that advice and you pushed that aside. Younot pay the full amount of the contract.
thought “Well, okay, we have got that advice” but
104. On value for money, you did say to Mr you did not take it. You were given advice from this
Osborne that the people you surveyed said they had particular Committee in fact because we looked into
value for money. On one level, for instance, was the some of the fraud andMrTrickett is absolutely right,
amount used £25 or £175—the £25 they were there was fraud rife throughout the country in
supposed to have paid and then the £55 that the further education colleges in franchising learning.
taxpayer is supposed to have paid. What ﬁgure was Halton College appeared in front of us where it was
the one in question, in the survey? So if you said, yes, an absolute disgrace what was happening there. We
I am satisﬁed we have value for money and I have were given guarantees whenwemade that report that
it would not happen again through the FEFC andgood value for mymoney, what did you use? The £25
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yourDepartment. Again you ignored that advice and (Mr Normington) All I can say to you is I am
committed to making sure these lessons are learnt inwent ahead willy nilly on this scheme which was
doomed to failure. the future. I have accepted that there were serious
mistakes made in this scheme. I will make sure that(Mr Normington) There are only a certain number
we learn these lessons across the Department. I haveof ways, Mr Steinberg, I can say I am sorry.
set in place the arrangements to make sure that
110. I am not interested to hear you say sorry, Mr everybody who is engaged with supplier and
Normington. I want to know why you ignored the contractor management is properly trained in that. I
advice when it was clearly in reports which said that have set up a proper unit to support project
there was huge scale fraud taking place with learning management. I am doing risk assessment from the
providers in further education colleges. We made a bottom to the top of the Department. I have learnt
report on that and we pointed out what was the lessons, that is all I can say.
happening. We were given assurances—it was not
114. Let us talk to Mr Aldridge. Mr Aldridge, youanother department, this was the Education
are just as much to blame as the Department to beDepartment—we have minutes of where the
quite honest as well. You should have insisted thatTreasury have responded to the recommendations
you should be listened to. Why did you not insist?that we have made and you ignored the Committee
(Mr Aldridge) It has been quite interestingof Public Accounts. You totally ignored us and
listening to the conversation that has been going onwent ahead.
because in a sense it is part of the issue. What we are(Mr Normington) We did not ignore the Public
talking about is not PFI but public/privateAccounts Committee, we did not ignore that report.
partnerships and this whole area of how the publicWe did not believe that the lessons from that report
and private sector interacts is a very, very big point.were relevant to this. I am sorry if that was wrong, it
It is not a point about the Department for Educationmay well have been wrong because it was a quite
and Skills, it is a bigger point.diVerent sort of scheme from the case where Halton
was franchising learning. I am quite prepared to say 115. Mr Aldridge, you are waZing.that was wrong but we believed these were two (Mr Aldridge) I am not waZing.diVerent cases. We did look at the providers which
had been in question in the Halton case and only one 116.Why did you not insist, get theDepartment to
FEFC provider of concern was also a provider in the say “Look, the risks here are enormous”? You knew
Individual Learning Accounts case. they were because you were saying that in a very soft
tone. You were saying that. You did not insist. What
111. The Further Education Funding Council was more important: the contract or getting the job
actually gave you advice and you ignored that, right?
totally ignored that. How you can say that there were (Mr Aldridge) We were managed at the contract
no similarities I cannot understand because it was level. Wewere not on the project board and we asked
exactly virtually what we said was happening in the to be on the project board, and we asked on
further education colleges. It was exactly what numerous occasions. The experience and power of
happened at Halton. It is almost an exact scenario. what we have got is actually being controlled by
(Mr Normington) We did take on some of the somebody who, frankly, is not up where the policy is
lessons. We did not take on enough of them. We did going to be decided. Systematically over a period,
not take the advice of the Further Education and we made a comment about that, and Mr
Funding Council and others about the risk to the Normington has accepted that, when diVerent
scheme. I am sorry, we did not do it. decisions were made, we were not a party to those
decisions. We actually looked in on 16 diVerent112. Not only did you not take advice on this
occasions.particular episode but you did not take advice, again,
from this Committee when we did the report on the 117. I am saying why did you not say “This scheme
cancellation of the beneﬁts fraud card project. We is crap. It is going to fail. The taxpayer is going to be
said in that report, if I remember correctly, that there robbed blind but we will still make our lucrative
was a need for the Department and the proposed contract out of it?” How much proﬁt did you make
partners to be honest with each other in terms of risk. out of this?
You were not honest with each other in that. It is not (MrAldridge) Because you look at something, you
a partnership, is it? Why did you ignore that report, asked that question, you have to think about what is
presumably one assumes that chief oYcers or happening over time. Over time you make those
permanent secretaries read the Public Accounts comments. What I have accepted I should have done
reports, why was that ignored? is I should have escalated that to the Permanent
(Mr Normington) I do not know why that speciﬁc Secretary or to a senior person within the
thing was ignored. Department. I should have escalated it to the
Minister also. I have to say to you it is not easy to get
113. We sit here and make recommendations, it is to the Minister, you must really understand that in
all just: “Well, it is the Public Accounts Committee, these Public Private Partnerships.
we will just ignore it” and that is just not on to be
quite honest. We sit here for hours making 118. This will be picked up this afternoon.
recommendations and they are just ignored, they (Mr Aldridge) You can say you want to escalate
should not be ignored. It cost the taxpayer £60 something, and I feel mortiﬁed that I did not because
million. If it had been listened to and advice had been I think this is a very good scheme and I hear whatMr
taken then we would not have a situation now where Normington has said about it so I should have done
that, I accept that. It is not an easy process and it is£60 million has been washed down the drain.
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about having skills, also, and the experience of the Mr Rendel
people you are dealing with on the other side of this 125. Mr Normington, you have mentioned ondivide which has got to be increased and improved, several occasions that there was a speciﬁc manifestoandMrNormingtonmade the point about that. That target that had to be met and you as civil servants
is a big point and again it cannot be ignored in any obviously had as your duty to meet the target that
of these debates that you are having because it comes you had been set. If there had been no speciﬁc target
back to the same thing every time. but just a general wish to introduce this scheme,
would the scheme have been introduced slower?119. Would you agree that it looks very much to
(Mr Normington) I do not know. Possibly. It is ame in these public/private partnerships that they are
hypothetical question. There was a wish to get thisnot so much a partnership really as what they are is
programme up and running. I guess if there had notthe public sector take all the risks and you take no
been that speciﬁc target date of 2002 it might haverisks at all and you end up with your proﬁt at the end
been possible to do it slower. There was a feeling thatof the day?
we had been spending three years at it andwe had not(Mr Aldridge) I listened to the debate about risk. made any progress.You take risk where you have an ability to be able to
126.Which would you have preferred to do, to rollinﬂuence the decisions around it. Where you cannot
it out on a more steady, slower basis or to start theinﬂuence those decisions commercially nobody is
whole thing later when you had got it ﬁxed?going to take a risk, you cannot possibly do that. You
(Mr Normington) With hindsight we should haveassess what your risk is. The greatest risk we have in
spent more time testing the processes and the systemsthis, and it is not something that has been touched
to destruction before it was introduced, so we shouldon, is the reputation side of us. That is something you
have introduced it on a slower timescale.cannot always price in. You do not take risks where
you do not feel that you have control. We had no 127. If there had not been this speciﬁc manifesto
control over the decisions that were going to be target when the number of bidders fell to one would
made. What we have said going forward is that we you have gone back to a re-tendering process of some
are not going to bid in those circumstances again. sort or were you always happy to go ahead with just
one bidder?120. That is very refreshing. How many contracts
(Mr Normington) I am never happy to go aheaddo you have with government just as a matter of
with one bidder because it reduces your choice, butinterest.
whenwe decided to go aheadwith Capita we believed(Mr Aldridge) We have in all about 300 contracts. that they could operate this contract and provide us
with the service needed and accounting oYcers have121. What are they worth?
to be conﬁdent about that whether there is one bidder(Mr Aldridge) We have about ten contracts with
or ten.government.
128. So if there had been no manifesto target date
122. And what are they worth? you would still have gone ahead with just one
(MrAldridge) They are worth just short of a billion bidder left?
over the life of the contracts. (Mr Normington) I think we probably would, yes,
because we were satisﬁed that Capita could deliver it.123. I have only got a few seconds left, I suspect.
Howmuchmoney do you expect to recover from this 129. Let me ask you a question about the quality
scandal and the fraud? How much do you expect to of the providers. It does seem to me one of the odd
recover as a matter of interest? things about this scheme is that you do not have any
(MrNormington) I do not know, I am afraid. I just means of testing the quality of the providers but you
seem to have relied entirely on the people using thecannot say that yet. We are pursuing it and we will
service to tell you whether the providers were anyseek to recover tens of millions of pounds. I do not
good or not. Firstly, does that not endanger theknow whether we will do that, partly because the big
clients in that if they happen to end up with amoney is probably with the 150 providers who are in
provider who is not any good they could waste a bitthe serious category and 99 of those are with the
of their money and quite a lot of your money ﬁndingpolice and we have to pursue the criminal case ﬁrst.
that out, and quite a lot of time obviously, and itMr Steinberg: Thank you.
might make it diYcult for them then to look for
another course that might be relevant to what they
need?
(MrNormington) I believe it was the fatal ﬂaw thatChairman
there was not more checking of providers. I believe
that was the absolutely fatal ﬂaw in the whole thing.124. Why did you not put Capita on the project
The design was that these were adults who would beboard?
putting some money of their own in and, therefore,(Mr Normington) Because at the time the whole
just as adults purchase services of all sorts we oughtmodel of this was we were buying a service, the
to be putting the onus on those adults to make theproject board takes the decisions and it conveys them
choices.to Capita. That was the way in which it was normal
to run these relationships two or three years ago. I 130. In particular some of the groups that youwere
think that is wrong, we have learnt that, but that was targeting were those who were not very fully
why we did it as far as I understand. educated up to that point, that was the whole point,
to go for those who had not got very many skills, ifChairman: Thank you.
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you like exactly the sort of people who would where we are trying to reach people who are not
actually ﬁnd it quite diYcult to judge whether a interested in training, or have not traditionally
particular provider was going to provide a good trained, that you should have intermediaries in those
training course or not. programmes because people need good advice to ﬁnd
(Mr Normington) I think that is fair comment their way round the training. That was not the case
although there were intermediaries we were trying to suYciently here.
use in the scheme. The best things that happened in
136. Can I go on to the legal advice that you werethe scheme were some of the small scale pilots within
apparently given that you needed to give six weeks’the scheme where we were trying to use
warning of a shut down. It is in paragraph 3.4. Youintermediaries like community groups, trades
did, in fact, shut the scheme down four weeks later.unions, to provide the kind of advice that those
(Mr Normington) Yes.people needed. Where we ran those small scale pilots
it was undoubtedly the case that where there were
137. On an emergency basis when you thought thattrusted intermediaries who could oVer that advice (a)
there was a lot of fraud going on.the training was better and (b) the individual got
(Mr Normington) Yes.better advice about it. I think that tells us how we
ought to be designing the scheme for the future.
138. Does that leave you open to any valid claims
131. Your statistics show, do they not, that 45% of either from providers or from the people doing the
those who were on this training actually heard about training, that they were not given suYcient warning?
the training ﬁrst from the providers, not through (Mr Normington) Some people have said that,
community schemes or anybody else but directly although we have not yet been pursued through the
from the providers. courts on that.We took legal advice again on the day
(MrNormington) Indeed, it was designed partly so that we stopped the scheme dead in its tracks. We
that providers would do themarketing of the scheme. believed that the public interest was so great on that
occasion that we had no option but to close the132. Which may be cheap for you but it may also
scheme down.lead to a waste of waste of money as appears to have
happened. 139. Even if it was illegal?
(Mr Normington) Yes, both those things are true. (Mr Normington) We did not believe that becauseIt was believed that if we could bring new providers of the overriding public interest it was an illegal thinginto the scheme they would reach individuals who or an unlawful thing to do on that day. We believedwould not normally be reached by the normal
it was absolutely essential to protect clients.mechanisms.
140. You still believe it would have been illegal to133. And they were provided with courses that
close it down four weeks earlier? You had to have thewere not appropriate for the client’s needs.
information on the fraud before it became legal to(Mr Normington) That, as it turned out, was the
close it down?case to some extent.
(Mr Normington) There was a debate about the
134. Have you decided, therefore, that you will not notice period we had to give. It would have been
use this method in the future? unreasonable to have closed the scheme down on 24
(Mr Normington) We have decided there is no way October, which was when we announced our notice
we are going to use thismethod in the future, it would period. There was a debate about how long was
be absolutely idiotic of us to do so. reasonable notice and our legal advice was that on
(Mr Lauener) Could I just give an example of how the basis of the information we had then six weeks
beingmore selective upfront about the providers that was a reasonable period.8
are involved yielded dividends. With the community
group projects, which were quite small scale, we 141. I am concerned that there may be some who
found there that 14% of the participants were from were trying to provide this training under the old
ethnic minority groups compared with ﬁve per cent scheme, the scheme which you closed, who may be
nationally, 22% of those that took part had no put oV now from providing training for a successor
qualiﬁcations before they took the learning scheme. Have you analysed at all how many people
compared with 16% of the national scheme. I think may have been put oVworking with the Government
that does show that if you get it right upfront then in future because of what you have done to them on
you get better results. this scheme?
(Mr Normington) We have had a lot of135. I am glad to hear that. It does seem to me that
consultations with legitimate providers since wethere is also a further worry that if you leave it up to
closed the scheme about this. I cannot say howmanythe people who are being trained to ﬁnd out ﬁrstly
whether the course is any good or not, if they ﬁnd out people have been put oV. A lot of the legitimate
it is not I am not quite sure how you then expect that people in the system are further education colleges,
information to ﬂow to the others who might be well known training providers. It is very unlikely that
wanting to take up that sort of training. Almost by they will be put oV. They will be muchmore cautious
deﬁnition these people will not necessarily be in about what a successor scheme is and we have not
contact with others who might be looking for the decided what that successor scheme should be.
same sort of training.
(Mr Normington) I think that is fair comment 8 Note by witness: Legal advice on reasonable notice was that
unless there are intermediaries who are advising four weeks would have ben acceptable; six weeks was
preferable.them. We know that in all training programmes
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(Mr Lauener) A lot of legitimate providers have this conveyor belt. At the end of the day, this is why
I answered the question about two years, if you aresaid to us that they want tighter checks on the
providers taking part because legitimate providers proceeding to prosecution that does take time. The
police and the Crown Prosecution Service need tofeel denigrated by the activities of those that we are
pursuing now. have that evidence and to be sure of it. Only then will
we pursue those people who are being prosecuted for
142. You have said on various occasions that you criminal oVences for recovery.9
would like the investigations to go faster, that it is Chairman: We will have to stop it there.
taking a long time to collect the evidence of whether
fraud has taken place or not. Can you go into that in
a bit more detail because you simply say it was Mr Davidsoncomplicated. You have not really told us what is the
145. I wonder if I could continue this question ofsticking point that is making it take so long to ﬁnd
fraud. Are fraud cases being pursued with the sameout whether particular training courses were being
vigour as beneﬁt fraud cases are being pursued?provided fraudulently.
Mr Field: More, we hope.(Mr Normington) I might ask Mr Lauener, who
(Mr Normington) I am not sure really.has been doing a lot of the work on this, to give you
the detail but basically this is a question of evidence. 146. I wonder if I could ask the National Audit
We have to collect the evidence from the individuals OYce, you mentioned that some cases might not be
that fraud has taken place. suYciently serious to be prosecuted, can I seek
clariﬁcation?143. As a layman it looks like a few questions
(Sir John Bourn) All Government departmentswould be enough. You could do that in a week or
accept that they have a responsibility to pursue fraudtwo.
cases. I think that where the diVerence is between,(Mr Normington) Maybe, do you want to try and
say, the present Department being examined by theexplain?
Committee and other departments like Work and(Mr Lauener) Let me talk about the way we are
Pensions is that Work and Pensions have more workgathering evidence about the problems. We have to
of this kind and they have more of a system for doingcome at this from a number of sources. Firstly, our
it. I think given the nature of the Department formain indicator is the complaints we have had from
Education and Skills’ work, they have less experiencemembers of the public and we have analysed these by
of handling the matters because they do not have soprovider so if a provider has had a lot of complaints
many of them. I do not think that there is anywe say there must be something to look at there.
diVerence in recognition of the responsibility toSecondly, when we closed the scheme downwe wrote
pursue fraudulent cases but I think there may be ato everyone on the individual learning database. We
diVerence in the outcome which has a lot to do withhad some returned mail “gone away” and as we
diVerent levels of departmental experience.followed that up it became clearer that there were
some cases where there were ﬁctitious names and 147. If people want to try and cheat the
ﬁctitious addresses, quite a small number but again Government they are better via the Education
evidence of serious fraud. We followed up then the Department than through the beneﬁts system?
providers that we have had concerns about by (MrNormington) Youwould not expectmewholly
contacting quite large volumes of learners directly on to agree with the Comptroller and Auditor General
the phone or by mail and we have visited providers’ on this. We are pursuing this with great
premises and looked at the records that they have determination and vigour. It is true that we do not
got. That process, not least with the large number of deal with fraud all the time in the way that the
providers we have got, does take quite a long time. beneﬁts system does. I happen to know quite a lot
about the beneﬁts system and when I was responsible144. Two years?
for part of it we did have a large amount of special(Mr Lauener) We need to assess the evidence we investigation work, and they were full time on that.have got as to whether it is the kind of problemwhere We have had to put people on to this, of course.we ought to pursue a recovery but not suYciently
serious to involve our special investigations unit, or 148. You will be an expert in the comparison then
if you worked in the beneﬁts section. How does itwhether it is suYciently serious, and some of the
frauds that we talked about earlier certainly are compare? Is it easier to cheat the Education
Department than Work and Pensions?suYciently serious, that we need to discuss with the
police whether there is enough evidence to pursue (Mr Normington) If you run a scheme like this, it
prosecution. is possible to defraud the Department for Education
and Skills.(MrNormington) Can I just clarify this point about
two years. I was asked a question I think about the 149. That is a yes.
scale of the fraud and I said we might not be fully (Mr Normington) I hope we will never run aclear about that for two years. It does notmean to say scheme again like this.that there is not a conveyor belt of providers here, 99
150. Can I ask in terms of prosecutions that haveof whom are with the police, another 60 are with our
taken place—I think there is one mentioned here—serious investigations unit who are potential police
can you clarify what the penalty was in those casescases. There are another 158 who are being pursued
and what the scale of the oVence was?now for recovery of money and there are 320 more
who are being investigated and may move down that
conveyor belt or may be cleared. It is not a static 9 Note by witness:There are in fact 314 more providers who are
being investigated.situation. All the time we are moving people down
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(Mr Normington) There is one conviction. Do you it probably was, it might not have been to say a light
touch at the beginning but you then have to put inknow the conviction?
checks further down the system and that was not(Mr Lauener) I think there was a prison sentence
done.for the conviction. I cannot quite recall the details.
151. If we can have that conﬁrmed to us. 157. Can I also ask about the policy assumption
(Mr Normington) Yes.10 that there seems to have been here about the merits
of competition as a device for raising quality152. Can I ask in terms of lessons to be drawn from
amongst providers. Am I right in thinking given thethis, would it be fair to draw the lesson that if you
scale of fraud that that did not work either?make a universal provision of the sort that you did
(Mr Normington) I am not sure we were trying tohere then disproportionately it will be the better oV,
get competition in the system.the better educated, those who need the provision the
(Mr Lauener) We were trying to bring newleast who will access it most? That is surely (a) true
providers in.and (b) not rocket science and ought to have been
taken into account by the Department in drawing up 158. The competition between providers was seen
this scheme? to be away of raising the quality of providers because
(Mr Normington) It is the case always that if there buyers would then be aware. Am I right in thinking
are universal schemes peoplewho are better educated that it did not work basically?
and better informed gain access to it more quickly. (Mr Normington) We were certainly looking to
bring in a much wider range of trainers or providers153. Since the better educated were not the target
than had ever been in there before so there was moregroup, why was there such a lack of focus in the
choice for the individual. In that sense I supposetargets?
there was more competition. Competition does not(Mr Normington) I need to clarify this. It was a
quite get what we were trying to do.We wantedmoredeliberate decision that the scheme would be
choice for individuals, we wanted trainers who haduniversal and that was partly because we do not
not traditionally gone into the normal system underassume that just because people have got degrees
the TECs and so on.they have completed their learning, particularly since
one of the priorities in the scheme was IT skills. That 159. You wanted presumably informed consumers
was a major priority in the scheme. Actually there is and because you did not have this then the attracting
a need in the population as a whole to stimulate of new providers did not actually result in an increase
people to learn IT skills. in the total human happiness in a sense because
people were not necessarily buying wisely.154. So a lot of the learners being graduates is
(Mr Normington) There was some good learningactually a cause for congratulation or not a cause for
within the scheme and we did bring in some smallany approbation?
providers who would not otherwise have come into(Mr Normington) We did not set out to exclude
the scheme. Of those 8,900 the vast majority actuallygraduates, theywere not a target group. It started out
were good providers or new providers who had thebeing a universal scheme to kick start people into
potential to provide training which had not beenlearning, including graduates, but it had within it
provided before. I do not think in that sense it was asome target groups who were not graduates.
complete disaster, it is just that there was this group155. Were the targets which were set for the of providers who did try to abuse the scheme.various people who were recorded to include
provision to focus their attention on the need and the 160. Okay. Can I ask about the question of
desire to attract in previous non learners? implementing policy quickly. Part of the defence,
(Mr Normington) People who had not done unless I have misunderstood, was that this whole
learning before or not recently or very low levels of scheme was being drawn up very much under the
skills and qualiﬁcations, those were the sorts of pressure of time. Are you saying that a scheme has
people, yes. got to be slow to be okay?
(Mr Normington) No. I am a bit cautious about156. Can I draw another lesson from this. We are
resting on the defence about time. After all, a lot ofin favour in principle of a light regulatory touch but if
time was spent following the 1997 election trying toyou do that clearly it opens up the potential for fraud,
ﬁnd the solution. It was the time that was spentdoes it not? What we have had here, am I right in
failing to ﬁnd the solution that squeezed the time forthinking, is a reduction in bureaucracy, an increase in
the rest of the Parliament. There was this keyfraud and if you let the private sector get their snouts
moment when virtually all the work that had beeninto the trough then there will be a proportion of
done on designing the scheme came to nought andthem who will try and rob the system blind.
the nature of the scheme changed. That happened at(Mr Normington) There clearly was fraud in the
the end of 1999 and suddenly the timescale becamesystem so some of what you said is true. If you are
very tight. We should not conclude that you do notgoing to take a decision to have very limited checks
need good, speedy timescales otherwise you never getat the gateway to the scheme you have to think what
anything introduced.the consequences of that are downstream and you
need to have much better monitoring downstream. 161. Indeed. If we start from the timewhen the ﬁrst
You have to assume there is going to be greater fraud scheme, as it were, collapsed or was withdrawn, part
and you have to pick it up in your monitoring. It was of the defence seems to be that the shoddiness of the
not necessarily the wrong decision, although I think second scheme was because of the pressure of time
that you were working under. I ﬁnd myself in a
10 Ev 28 quandary as to whether or not the public sector is
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always slow and ponderous and the private sector 170. Three schools would have been better oV if
that money had been available for schoolalways corrupt and rapacious. What do we do in
these circumstances if we cannot rely on yourselves to construction. How many people do you think have
been deprived of this one-oV educative opportunitybe speedy and the private sector to be honest?
because the money was defrauded from them as well(MrNormington) I am not sure that I know how to
as from you?answer that one in truth. In the end we were speedy
(MrNormington) I do not know the answer to that.and it failed.
171. You are talking of tens of millions, not ten162. Indeed.
million. It must be more than 20 million. I do not(Mr Normington) Whether it is slow or fast you
know whether you would like to put a ceiling on it.need to implement it properly and we did not
You say tens, that is very vague. What sort of ﬁgureimplement it properly. Some of what happened here
do you have at the back of your mind where youwas not about speed, it was about the way in which
think “oh lord, it may get that far”?it was implemented. I cannot guarantee that if it had
(Mr Normington) In terms of money that was.been implemented slower everything would have
been right about it. 172. That was defrauded.
(Mr Normington) For fraud and abuse it could be163. It is a question of learning lessons and the
up to 60 million.question of whether or not this is a valuable learning
experience. My colleague, Mr Steinberg, has already 173. Up to 60 million?
made the point that he thought that the Education (Mr Normington) But that is the total amount of
Department had already had valuable learning money that might have been improperly spent under
experiences from which nothing seems to have been this programme.
learned.What conﬁdence canwe have thatwe are not 174. So that is the money that would have paid for
going to be here in another little while with another well over a third of a million people to go through
educational equivalent of the Dome? the process?
(Mr Normington) I and my senior colleagues are (Mr Normington) It might.
doing everything possible to make sure these lessons
175. Well over.are learned. I have very big programmes in place to
(Mr Normington) One of the problems with this isimplement all the lessons from this programme,
some of the people whose names were used and whoincluding training people properly, making sure that
were signed up for training either did not want it orno-one manages contracts who is not trained,
did not need it. In a sense that was the nature of theincluding the lessons about risk assessment are
fraud in many cases, that they were signed up butlearned, about project management are learned. I
actually they did not want it. There are probablywill give you my assurance that we will learn those
quite a lot fewer people who are disgruntled aboutlessons. I guess there will be mistakes down the road
this because they did not know that they were on thebut I hope there will never be anything on this scale.
scheme in the ﬁrst place.
164. My worry is that by the time we come to the
176. When you were talking about fraud a littlenext valuable learning experience you might very
earlier the comparison was drawn with the fact thatwell have been promoted somewhere else.
you are the Education Department and Sir John(Mr Normington) I am not going to go anywhere
agreed that you are less likely to come across fraudunless somebody moves me.
than, say, social security. What was yourMr Davidson: Make some mistakes and you are
predecessor’s job before he became Permanentsafe.
Secretary of your Department?
(Mr Normington) He was the Chief Executive of
the Beneﬁts Agency.
Mr Williams 177. I thought he was. I seem to remember him as
chief witness on various occasions. So he was well165. You were 74 million over budget on this
aware of the problems of fraud. You have describedprogramme. Where did the money come from?
this as an innovative programme and you have(Mr Normington) It came from the Department’s
described it as a programme the like of which youunderspend which was quite substantial.
had never done before in the Department and you
also said that you knew theDepartmentwould not be166. PFI programmes?
able to do it itself. All of this would suggest higher(Mr Normington) No, there were a number of
scrutiny, not lower scrutiny, would it not?reasons for that underspend.
(Mr Normington) I said that we could not run the
167. We will not go into too much detail. system to link the provider and the individual
(Mr Normington) It is not attributable to one together, we had not got the competence to do that,
place, there was a signiﬁcant underspend in the but we thought we had the competence to purchase
Department’s budget. the contractor who could do that.
MrWilliams:You see this brings us back to an old,168. How many schools could you have built for
old conundrum for this Committee and I happen to74 million?
be on the losing side on it. I actually believe thatwhen(Mr Normington) Three.
there are cases where the performance has been
169. Three schools. absolutely abysmal, and I think that is the only way
to describe the performance of the Department here,(MrNormington) It depends where they are. It can
cost anything from 15 million. that the people who were there at the time should be
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sitting where you are having to sit instead of you Trickett—that you are in discussion about the
termination of a contract. Why are you in discussioneating humble pie and also not being able to explain
how certain decisions were arrived at that were not about that? Were any penalty clauses triggered by
what happened?your fault because you were not there and you were
not party to the discussions. I hopemy colleagueswill (MrNormington) I just need to be clear about this.
sign up to the group on this Committee that agree We had some discussions with Capita last spring
with me — about whether we would move on to a second
Mr Field: Shall we vote now. Individual Learning Accounts scheme and we agreed
in principle that wewere going to do the work on that178. Yes, we will have a show of hands for future
and we would work with Capita on that because theyhearings.
had all the knowledge and expertise which would be(Mr Normington) I think that is the approach they
lost otherwise. More than a week ago ministersare adopting in the Welsh Assembly, is it not.
decided that they were going to pause because they
179. I am glad to hear it. It is a pity it is not done wanted to take a wider look at the way in which we
more often here. We do it once or twice and then funded individual learning and they did not want to
letters come in fromministers andmost senior people go ahead straight away with a second scheme. In
in the Civil Service complaining it is not fair to bring those circumstances we have to have a discussion
people out of retirement to explain what they did with Capita about our costs, their costs, their
before they went into retirement but to leave liabilities, our liabilities, that is what we are doing at
someone else to do it. Again, several of my the moment.
colleagues—Angela and David—have touched on
the illogicality of saying that you are going to leave
186. That is interesting. Was this project notto the learners the responsibility for assessing the
proﬁtable, Mr Aldridge?value of the courses. One of the main aims here was
(Mr Aldridge) Yes, it was proﬁtable.to get into the IT area, was it not, that was a major
objective?
(Mr Normington) Yes.
187. It was proﬁtable.
180. Now do you know of any area, other than (Mr Aldridge) Yes.
deep science, that is more prone to gobbledegook as
far as the uninitiated are concerned when they are
188. A good reasonable working proﬁt. You gottrying to ﬁnd out what it is all about? How can you
what you would have expected from it? I am notassume that people would not know what they
making any snide comments.should be looking for? By deﬁnition we are going to
be able to make the judgment the Department chose (Mr Aldridge) We always operate under an open
not to make for itself. It was crazy, was it not? book accounting arrangement so everybody would
(MrNormington) This morning before I came here know what our proﬁt level was. Equally we incurred
I had another conversation with those who were penalties—service credit as it is called—for under
there when these decisions were taken and I asked performance.
these questions. With hindsight they were the wrong (Mr Normington) There is a proﬁt share
decisions. At the time they did not believe they were arrangement in the scheme so that some of the proﬁts
taking the wrong decisions. come back to Government.
(Mr Aldridge) In the reduced costs.181. You are dealing with intelligent people, you
(Mr Normington) Yes.are dealing with people who are supposed to be
immersed in education—
(Mr Normington) That is why it is inexplicable.
189. We assume most proﬁts went right outside
182. I want to ﬁnish my question. They did not Government and right outside Capita in fact. Does it
understand the people you were targeting to get IT not seem rather strange that what has been described
education were the people who were least capable of by the Permanent Secretary as all the knowledge and
determining whether what was on oVer was in any expertise you have here which they would be very
way relevant. loath to lose, you must be the front bidder if you care
(Mr Normington) Clearly there was a belief at the to go for it, now suddenly and inexplicably it was
time that those individuals would be able to make decided although it was proﬁtable you did not want
those choices, just as you do as a purchaser in life. anything else to do with it?
(MrAldridge) No, it is not like that at all. We have183. None of the people involved who you asked
had a teamof people working together onwhat couldthis morning, who are sitting behind you, might be
have been an ILA 2 for some time. The decisionable to tell us why they came to that decision? How
whichministers havemade I think is entirely the rightmany have you brought with you, oYcials?
one. They want to review the whole aspect of adult(Mr Normington) Apart from my colleague I have
learning, it is not only individual learning. It is quitethree people behind me.
right in those circumstances that the contract which
184. None of them— we have for delivery of Individual Learning
(Mr Normington) I think some have come for the Accounts would cease.
spectator sport. (Mr Normington) I would be very surprised if the
successor scheme looked anything like this, indeed I185. They did not come expecting to be involved.
would be alarmed if it looked like this.I was intrigued by one of your comments that you
indicated—I believe it might have been to Mr Mr Williams: I think we would all be alarmed.
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(Mr Normington) He was right.Mr Bacon
197. Why did you ignore the letter? It is addressed190. Sir John, may I start with a question to you.
to the Secretary of State.Mr Normington has answered about the project
(MrNormington) I have looked back at this. It wasboards and the fact that it was not standard practice
speciﬁcally about the decision to impose a cap on thein the last two or three years to have project boards
80%discount. It was a speciﬁc issue about that, it wasleaves me with some sympathy for Capita but also a
not a generalised thing although clearly he waslittle bit of suspicion because it does not sound tome,
worried.from what I know of practising purchasing and
consultancy, like standard practice. I am looking at 198. He was not just talking about the cap, he does
the 1994 report on the Government’s use of go on to talk about the cap. He says, and I will quote
consultants prepared by the Cabinet OYce in which “As more details of the scheme have emerged we
it says in paragraph 4.44 “On some projects there have expressed our concern both to DfES and to
may be a requirement simply to have a project Capita that there was insuYcient detail in the rules”.
manager alongside the consultants. On others a joint He was making a general point also and he goes on
team will be set up often using some of the to say he was not the only one who warned you.
organisation’s best people to give them a valuable (Mr Normington) He was making a general pointlearning opportunity.” Is it possible the NAO could that people were abusing the lack of a cap on the 80%give us a note on areas in diVerent parts of Whitehall and saying that therefore they were unscrupulousof project boards working alongside with the providers who were willing to make money out ofpurchasers, the department, the provider, alongside this scheme, yes.one another on the same board?
199. Is it not blindingly obvious that if you do not(Sir John Bourn) Yes, I will do such a note,
have quality assurance for the providers that you areChairman.11
inviting rogue providers in?
191. That would be excellent. Mr Normington, (Mr Normington) There should have been a
could you say how much money from this scheme decision to quality assure the providers, yes.
went to animal rights extremists?
200. Have you seen this document,Responsibilities(Mr Normington) I cannot tell you oV hand, no.
of an Accounting OYcer?
192. Do you have an estimate? (Mr Normington) Yes.
(MrNormington) I do not thinkwe do.Dowe have
201. So you have read it?an estimate?
(Mr Normington) Yes.(Mr Lauener) We could probably get one quite
quickly from colleagues at the back. 202. It talks about the responsibilities of an
accounting oYcer to see that appropriate advice is193. Could you send us a note. Is it correct when
handed to ministers on all matters of ﬁnancialthe managing director of Huntingdon Life Sciences
propriety and regulatory and more broadly on allwas attacked by animal rights extremists a large
deliberations on prudent and economicwadge of Individual Learning Account application
administration. It goes on to say things you must doforms were found in the back of his car?
if you are worried and you must seek direction and(Mr Normington) I do not know that.12
provided those procedures have been followed the
194. Perhaps you could include that in the note. I PAC can be expected to recognise that the
am curious about this question of quality assurance. accounting oYcer bears no personal responsibility
I can understand that from the point of view of the for the transaction. Can you say why a direction was
people who are to receive the training if you are not sought?
trying to reach out to people who have been (Mr Normington) Because there was never a
marginalised and not had training, but which dispute between oYcials and ministers about the
baboon came up with the idea that you could not design and nature of this scheme, therefore there was
have quality assurance for the providers and get never the need to seek a direction. It was not the case,
anything other than abuse? I regret to say, that oYcials in my Department were
(Mr Normington) That was a decision taken in the saying to ministers “you should not do this” or “you
Department. should not do it this way”, it did not happen like that.
It was a perfectly amicable set of discussions.195. You used the word “hindsight”, did you not?
(Mr Normington) Yes. 203. And you all agreed?
(Mr Normington) Everybody agreed.196. It is correct you did not need hindsight, is it
not, it is correct therewere very clearwarnings. I have 204. I am looking at the evidence that Mr John
got a letter here from Mr James O’Brien of Pitman Healey gave when he was Adult SkillsMinister to the
Training Group, a very reputable training provider, Education Select Committee. He was asked how
in which he says “As a responsible training provider much the overspend was and after some intervention
we were worried about the scheme. The lack of detail by the Chairman on behalf of Mr Shaw, one of the
left the scheme open to abuse which would not be Members, because he could not get a clear answer,
helpful either to the initiative itself or the majority of the answer came as to how much was the overspend:
the training sector”. Would you agree that he was “We cannot give you a sense, even a ballpark, I regret
right? to say, of what the possible overspends are going to
be.” In other words, structurally the system was
11 Ev 30 designed such that it was impossible to even know
what the overspends were. Mr Healey goes on to say12 Ev 28
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later “We simply were not able to control the has the capability to understand where and by whom
activities, conduct the investigations, protect the serious abuse has taken place. They point out that the
proper use of public funds and the interests of serious abusers entered this market solely to exploit
Individual Learning Account holders by working the ILA loopholes and they would have closed their
with the systemwe had set up”. Given that you set up operations by now. Angela Eagle has gone now but
a system like this, when you came as accounting she said that you were deluded earlier thinking that
oYcer in May 2001 even at that point could you not it would not be abused and I think you are still
have said “this is a system that breaches my legal deluded now thinking that you can chase after them
responsibility looking after public funds in so serious for all this money. You talked about big money but
a way that, minister, I think it should be stopped and the big money is in accounts in the Caribbean and in
if youwant to continue it then I shall need direction”? Switzerland by now, is it not?
You could have done that, could you not? (Mr Normington) It may be but I do not think that
(Mr Normington) I could if I had seen that was the stops us trying to get at those who we know were
case. When I arrived in May 2001 I did have a culpable and that is what we are trying to do.
brieﬁng about it but no-one was brieﬁng me that this
210. But in the process the genuine ones are beingwas a problem.
screwed, are they not?
205. Is it correct that the £199 million was for (MrNormington) The genuine ones have been paid
two years? for the training that they have done. We continue
(Mr Normington) Yes. to pay.
206. So when you came in as accounting oYcer in 211. Are you saying that there are no genuine
May 2001 we see from an answer to one of my training providers who are owed money by you who
colleagues, Mr Turner, to a parliamentary question have not had it?
in August 2001 you were spending £26 million a (MrNormington)No, I am not saying that. Almost
month and in September 2001 £25 million. I do not all the money that we owe has now been paid to what
have the ﬁgures for May, June and July, they are not we believe are legitimate training providers. I cannot
in that question. At that running rate youwould have say that the money we are withholding is withheld
been spending about £300 million per year, in other with absolute certainty from the right people, but we
words £600 million over two years, so you were have paid a substantial amount of money over the
running at about three times the rate of budget by the last few months to the legitimate training providers.mid summer, were you not? About 95% of the claims outstanding have now
(MrNormington) By the late summer, but that was been paid.
why we stopped the scheme. (Mr Lauener) We are talking about 60 or 70
million, most of which we expect not to be207. You did not stop the scheme until—an
legitimate claims.announcement was made in October, was it not?
(Mr Normington) On 24 October. 212. You said that there were 99 cases with the
police.208. At the end ofOctober. But even inAugust and
even in September you were running at a rate of three (Mr Normington) Yes.
times what it was supposed to be.
213.WestMercia Police have told me that they are(Mr Normington) First of all, the clear belief was
sitting on a lot of ﬁles that they do not know what tothat this was a successful scheme and we were
do with because there is no case to answer.prepared, therefore, to fund it above its budget
(Mr Normington) I do not know that that is thebecause we believed it was reaching learners who had
case. Not that I know of.never had learning before. Secondly, under my
leadership of the Department we took a series of 214. Could you let us know in a note what advice
steps from July onwards to try to stem the growth of you have had from West Mercia Police about this?
the scheme which failed. Every time we took a step (Mr Normington) I do not believe that is so.13
the scheme was attacked from another quarter. You
could probably say that we should have closed it a 215. I would like to ask a question about the
few weeks earlier but I think that is with the beneﬁt contract. It states in the report that there was no
of hindsight. We took some decisive action, and contract between the Department and training
certainly the NAO Report says that, that we closed providers. As I understand it, and I have talked to
the scheme promptly when we realised that we could lawyers who say the same, a contract requires two
not stop it any other way. That was what we did. things, it requires an oVer and it requires acceptance
and if there is consideration as well that helps. This209. One of the problems which Mr Jenkins
had all three, did it not, it had an oVer, it hadreferred to was that you have caused a lot of damage
acceptance and it had consideration?to genuine training providers, and therewere genuine
(Mr Normington) I think so far as there was atraining providers who were doing good work. They
contract it was between the individual and theare now ﬁnding that they are having diYculty having
provider, I do not think it was with the Department.a dialogue with the Department. In a letter I received
The oVer was to the individual. The oVer of theit says that genuine training providers are ﬁnding it
training was to the individual and the payment wasalmost impossible to enter into any dialogue with the
to the provider for that individual’s training. I amnotDepartment to validate the assertions that the
a lawyer.Department has made or understand the evidence
upon which they are based. Those aVected say that
13 Ev 29even now they do not believe that the Government
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216. Even though you were encouraging the 221. The taxpayers’ position would be
strengthened, would it not, if the Audit OYce was inmarket, and in factMr Grover said in his evidence to
the Select Committee that you were trying to widen from the word go in designing the process and
reported to this Committee if it was unhappy?the base and you said the same this afternoon, you do
not think you bear any responsibility for what (Mr Normington) That would be a possibility, yes.
happened to the training providers? To some extent because of their resources I think
they rely on our internal audit to do that. There are(MrNormington)We have done our best to pay for
the training that took place and we have said that we lots of contacts with our internal audit but I am open
to those sorts of suggestions.will not pay further than that. We have tried to meet
all legitimate claims. 222. If there had been contact with other
Mr Bacon: I have run out of time. departments, which the PrimeMinister promised ﬁve
years ago, you would know the Department for
Health, for example, has speciﬁcally designed
Mr Field software which throws up patterns of fraud from
contractors.217. Mr Normington, I thought your response to
(Mr Normington) Yes.Alan Williams was interesting when he claimed that
we have got the wrong person before us today and 223. And had you employed similar software
you carefully pointed out that in theWelsh Assembly taxpayers would have been saved a great deal of
they have the person who made the decisions. I hope money.
that is something the Committee will follow up. I am (MrNormington) That is a very fair point and that
not about chasing you, I am about looking to the point is well taken. Of course it is after the event but
future so that in a sense we can look back and see that that is true.
this was a rather expensive Individual Learning
224. When your predecessor was looking atAccount against fraud for the Department and other
placing this contract, and I assume you have lookeddepartments. Five years ago the Prime Minister
at the ﬁle, and it looked at Capita, is there anythinglaunched a strategy which he promised taxpayers
in the ﬁle which suggests that Capita was runningwould be across Government about countering
anything successfully?fraud. Have you ever read that document?
(Mr Normington) They run a number of contracts(Mr Normington) I do not recall reading it, no.
for the Department, the biggest I think is the
218. You have meetings every week of Permanent teachers’ pension scheme which they have run
Secretaries, have you ever had on the agenda how successfully for us for ﬁve years. It is just being re-
you best counter fraud across Government? tendered at the moment. We have evidence of
(Mr Normington) We have had some discussions working with Capita and it has been very successful.
about that and the OYce of Government Commerce,
225. For example, had your predecessor picked upwhich has been set up in recent years, has that at the
the phone to the chief oYcer of Westminster, whichforefront of its drive to improve contracting across
is a couple of blocks away, he would have been toldgovernment. I have described this story to my
that the very best housing beneﬁt department in thecolleagues and we have had a general discussion
country had been reduced to rubble by Capita. Thatabout that and the action is with the OYce of
might just have sounded warning notes to you.Government Commerce on whose board I sit.
(Mr Aldridge) I would like an opportunity to
219. Can I ask you not to leave it withGovernment answer that.
but to keep it with you and the Permanent Secretaries
226. I will bring you in. I am talking to thefor these following reasons: one of the
Permanent Secretary.recommendations the Prime Minister made was that
(Mr Normington) We always take a check on thein any new initiative the Government would
people we are about to do business with, particularlyundertake to try and design out fraud in the system.
where it is a large scale contract like this. We hadIf that had been followed by anybody in your
evidence of working with Capita which had beenDepartment some care would have been taken to ask
successful.other departments which devised new beneﬁts or new
allowances what steps should be taken. That was not 227. Could we have a note on the successes?
followed at all in this case, was it? (Mr Normington) Yes.14
(Mr Normington) That was not and that is one of Chairman: Mr Aldridge, do you want to come in?
the lessons we have learned and that is being done Mr Field:Can I just bring the Comptroller in ﬁrst?
now. Chairman:Yes. I just want to giveMrAldridge the
opportunity to answer —220. Was not another lesson that when any
department is taking on a new initiative they ought 228. We have had the teachers’ pension scheme
to ask the Audit OYce to come in at the beginning running without hiccups for at least 60 years under
rather than come in afterwards when everything has one framework.When did you last check on howwell
gone wrong? it is all operating?
(Mr Normington) I do not mind that at all. Often (Sir John Bourn) We audit the teachers’ pension
the National Audit OYce does run alongside major scheme every year so there is a certiﬁcate provided by
projects and has lots of contacts with our own us on the way in which the ﬁnances are managed.
internal auditors. The books are open and they can
229. Mr Aldridge?come and look at anything. On the basis of this story
I am happy to have anyone advising us and
14 Ev 29supporting us in trying to improve what we do.
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(Mr Aldridge) My comment, Mr Field, would be ships because when they made mistakes as big as this
the company went under. You have presided overthat we have been in business for 17 years. You do
not stay in business for 17 years if you have a record this farce and you are turning a proﬁt.
that is in line with what you are suggesting. We have (Mr Aldridge) The responsibilities that we had in
over 300 major contracts, 92% retention rate of those this project, which I have not really hadmuch chance
contracts. We have 25,000 customers and, to talk about here, have been very clear in what we
thankfully, those customers are very happy with the had responsibilities for, what we did, howwe advised
performance we have. In the contract youmentioned and the fact that we were not part of the overall
with Westminster you may like to know that the strategy and the way the thing was developed was an
contract has been extended on two occasions. The error and a big one. Some of the things that happened
performance of that contract is way ahead of what around that scheme, therefore, had an eVect on this
was achieved by the in-house team when it was and that is the reason why we are here today. You
transferred. It had problems when it transferred. made a remark about the proﬁt.Wemake 11% proﬁt
Youknowa lot about housing beneﬁts and you know margins.Whatwe do for local authorities and central
what a diYcult area housing beneﬁts is. We have government probably saves them between 15, 20 and
turned that contract into a very successful one. If you 30%, so if you add the two together there is 40%
have a conversation with the chief executive of ineYciency. We helped save some of that money in
Westminster, as you suggest, I think Mr Rogers will terms of public sector spend and we invest. There is
support me in what I have just said about that. a whole combination of things that Capita does and
it is not possible to make simple statements and ask230. The problem is the chief executive of any simple questions in one area, you have got to look atauthority that employs Capita has to admit they were the totality.wrong and also knows that Capita will have pinched
234. One last point to the Permanent Secretary, iftheir best staV. If you take the contract back the staV
I may. When you are thinking about the lessons herewhich you had previously are not in post or would
and how you are trying to counter fraud in thenot be in post?
Department, could I suggest that you look at the(Mr Aldridge) I am enormously proud with
parliamentary answers you have given recentlyCapita, which employs 18,500 people now, a
when, for example, I and other Members have beencompany I started from scratch, over 10,000 of those
asking you about what your counter fraud strategypeople have transferred to us from the public sector.
is, whether you think the answers were adequate orThe whole company is enormously lucky to have the
not?people we have got and has been a very successful
(Mr Normington) I will do that, yes.15company. When you made those remarks we wrote
to you and asked if we could come and speak to you
about what you said. It is not true that we strip
Chairmanpeople out. People who join us join us under TUPE
and I can assure you that a lot of people who have 235. What has been happening to your share price
joined us would not want to go back. They are recently, Mr Aldridge?
developed, trained, we spend over 2% of our budget (Mr Aldridge) The share price has performed in
on management development. Our record in line with the market.
employment is 1% of those only in compulsory
236. Exactly in line with the market?redundancy, 7% staV turnover, which is half that in
(Mr Aldridge) Better than the market actually.the public sector, particularly in central government.
Chairman: I think Mr Ian Davidson has a coupleThis is a company that people like working with and,
of questions.interestingly enough, that unions admire as well as
customers. I am very proud of what we have
achieved.
Mr Davidson
231. How much have you lost on this contract?
237. Twopoints. The ﬁrst is about the public sector(Mr Aldridge) The loss in terms of—
comparator. I was struck by the point made by Mr
232. You are presenting Capita as a success Aldridge about his lack of access to the high reaches
because it makes all these proﬁts but howmuch have of the Department and therefore the ability to
you lost on this contract? inﬂuence how things were progressing. Taking that
(MrAldridge) Under the terms of the contract and into account, and also with hindsight, do you think
what we were billed, we have not lost money on the that the public sector comparator that was arrived at
contract. We have loss of our reputation in terms of when the contract was let was a fair and reasonable
our track record. I am enormously proud of the work one?
that we do with the Department. The work that was (Mr Normington) I believe it was. We had lots of
referred to on teachers’ pensions is quite professional advice about it. It was a comparison
phenomenal, what has been achieved and the people with what it would cost to do this in the public sector
who have transferred to us and the way the service is and it was a properly constructed model. I believe it
being oVered. That is what has been aVected by that.
I have watched with interest some of the comments 15 Note by witness: There are a number of Parliamentary
that have made about our track record. Our track Questions which have been answered on counter-fraud
record is second to none. policy. The replies are accurate and detail fully the
Department’s policies. Ref HC Debate, 28 January 2002,
233. You see we would still be building ships in cols 101W-102W; HC Debate, 5 February 2002, col 881W-
Birkenhead if every time we had a ﬁasco the ship 882W; HC Debate, col 1541W-1542W and HC Debate, 15
May 2002, col 646W.company still made money, but we ceased building
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was fair. It was in the context of a set of decisions, understand why we are a bit vexed at the prospect
that you have not had any loss whatsoever, in factwhich we have discussed at length today, which were
the wrong decisions. you have made exactly as much money as you would
have had the whole thing gone ﬁne?238. I wondered particularly whether this question (Mr Aldridge) Under the terms of the contract weof access which seems to some extent to have have not because we would have had a ﬁve yearcontributed to the disaster might have been avoided contract and it would have been a very successfulhad it been a public sector contractor undertaking contract in terms of what we all would have wanted,the work that Capita had done, whether or not the which was the whole scheme to be successful. Weculture in the Department, the organisation of the have penalties and those penalties are undercontract, would have been diVerent in that the discussion. As we said, we have a proﬁt share so anyfeedback would have been greater allowing the proﬁts above a level which was agreed, and in openDepartment to remedy the diYculties? book, have been shared with the Department in(Mr Normington) It depends what had been set up terms of a reduced price of what has been provided.but I guess if it was wholly within theDepartment the
242. You are not sharing any losses thechances arewewould have hadmore direct feedback.
Department has made?I am not really proud of that because actually we
could not have run it in the Department. We did not (Mr Normington) There is a discussion going on
have the competence to set up that kind of system. about the termination of the contract in which there
will be an issue about the contribution that Capita239. The ﬁnal point I want to make is to the makes.gentleman from Capita. I was struck by the point
(Mr Aldridge) There is an issue around, of course,about yourselves having made money out of what
what is under our control and what is not underseems on the face of it to have been a disaster. Do you
our control.believe that your ﬁrm has any culpability for what
has happened here? 243. I understand that.
(Mr Aldridge) We made money because of the (MrNormington) Perhaps you could leave us to try
process and the contract that we have and that is not and negotiate this.
uncommon so there is nothingwhich is diVerent here.
Do I feel that we could have done more? I think we
could have done more but I have to say that the Mr Bacon
critical point is that we were restricted in doing more.
244. Just a couple of questions, Mr Normington.I think that has come out in the NAO report. I feel
The cash referred to so far was £273.4 million.that is one of the lessons which has to come out of
(Mr Normington) Yes.this, it has to come out of it for us and I think it has
to come out of it for the whole area of public/private 245. £55 million for Capita, that is a separate
partnerships. If we could have done that more I think amount from the £273 million?
that on some of the things which have happened, (Mr Normington) Yes.
some of the lessons, we could have had a (Mr Lauener) The £273.4 million was the whole
contribution to it and I believe that the expertise that programme spend—
the company has got would have been better used. (Mr Normington) —Including £55 million.
Again that came out from the NAO Report. (Mr Lauener) —Not including £55 million.
240. In short, on the question of do you have any 246. That is my question. Assuming Capita got all
culpability, the answer would be no for the reason their money, it would be on top of the 273?
you have outlined and you bear no blame at all in any (Mr Lauener) No, 273.4 includes the amounts we
shape or form? have paid to Capita already.
(Mr Aldridge) No, I do not think that is a fair (Mr Normington) 273 is the estimate. The current
comment at all. As I said to you, I should have said overspend is 74, we estimate the overspend will be
more to the Permanent Secretary, and I should have more than that.
got the minister to express our concerns. The
247. I thought I was trying to ask a very simpleconcerns we had, we had them for some time. If you
question.look at what was around in the whole of the process
(Mr Normington) Sorry.that we were a part of, the management information
which was there had all the information to do a lot of 248. I am trying to ﬁnd out how much taxpayers’
the things. If you look at the comparisons between us money has been spent on this programme altogether.
and we ran Scotland and Ireland, and you look at (Mr Normington) £273 million.
some of the comparisons there, there were things
249. In total.which we put into the pot. I think we did not feel that
(Mr Normington) In total.some of those things were at the right level and that is
a critical point. I think we should have shouted more 250. As at June 2002. How much of that £273about that. There were key things around blank million is money that has gone to Capita as opposedforms and distance learners where we felt very to for training?uncomfortable and that would have been part of it. (Mr Normington) We have not completed our
payments to Capita and our discussions with Capita.241. Do you understand my diYculty then about
the situation? Iwas seeking to clarifywhether you felt The overspend is about £74 million and we are
estimating it will be about 93, 93.6, 94, something likeyou had any culpability at all. You have indicated
that you felt you did not have the degree of that, and that makes an assumption about the
payment to Capita.culpability, not as much as the Department. Can you
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251. So what you are saying is when you cash up (Mr Normington) I will do my best.18
in total the expenditure on ILAs, including Capita, 257. How much have you paid Capita so far?
including money paid to providers, etc, will be about (Mr Lauener) It is about £32 million.296 million?
258. I have already asked for a note on the(Mr Normington) That is about right, yes.
situation with the police who I am told have told you252. The money for the 70 staV that you are that there is no case to answer. A detailed note onemploying trying to sort out this mess, is that on top? that would be helpful. I have also asked you about
(Mr Normington) Yes, I am having to pay that the animal rights extremists as well and I believe there
from my budget. is evidence of that, although again I will leave that
253. Just a rough calculation, taking the average with you. There was a newspaper article about al-
wage as £20,000 a year, that would be £1.4 million a Qaeda, I do not know if it was just speculation. Do
year for two yearswhichwould be £2.8million on top you have any evidence that money went to al-Qaeda?
of that, is that right? (Mr Normington) No, we have no evidence
(Mr Normington) Possibly. whatsoever.
Chairman: That would have been a show stopper254. Could you give us a note on all of the
at the end of the meeting.expenditure setting it out rather more clearly: what
you have paid to Capita so far, the various scenarios 259. You are aware of the article in the Daily
you will be paying and so on? I am not conﬁdent that Telegraph?
this is the ﬁnal number. I would like to get the total (Mr Normington) Yes, I am. Of course we have
ﬁnal number. Could you also include in the note a looked at it and there is no evidence whatsoever of
more detailed summary of what is in paragraph 2.51 that.
on the largest amounts that have been paid where it
260. You are quite conﬁdent that no money wentsays “Twenty providers had claimed over £1.5
to international terrorism. It was so easy to get itmillion through the scheme; two had claimed £6
could have gone anywhere, could it not?million”. I was told there was one provider who got
(MrNormington) I am as conﬁdent as I can be, but£7.5 million. I do not know if that is right or not but
in the end I do not know for sure.I was told that it was. What would be the cost, if you
Chairman: None came to me anyway.could provide a note setting out who got what going
down the scale, as it were. 261. The Audit Commission published a report
(Mr Normington) Yes.16 Ghost in the Machine in February 1998. Are you
familiar with that?Mr Bacon: And also if you could list and name
those providers whowere gettingmore than amillion (Mr Normington) Yes, in general terms.
pounds a week at any point because these are the Mr Bacon: It was quoted in the Education Select
ones where you would have had to be getting under Committee. “Senior management still appears to
the £200 scheme 5,000 students per week, which is the lack a commitment to improving IT security and
equivalent of a small university each week, and when cracking down on abuse”, that was February 1998
those payments were happening, that would be quite and it would still appear to be true. I concur with
interesting to know — what everyone else said about the need for us to take
even more seriously warnings to the public sector
about IT fraud. It appears that the warnings which
Chairman have been received have not been taken notice of.
255. Are you happy with providing this
information? It is coming at you thick and fast, I
Mr Rendelhope somebody behind is taking a note of it.
(Mr Normington) I am sure that somebody behind 262. I have one speciﬁc question, if I may, which I
me will take it. The bit that I am not certain about is do not think anyone has asked yet unless I was asleep
whether we can name the providers to you. I will do at the time, referring to paragraph 3.14(a) where
my best to provide you with the information you there is a very intriguing reference to a provider who
want. may have been involved in the circulation of
Mr Jenkins: It is public. instructions on how to circumvent the system. It
(MrNormington) Sorry, you can have it. I just need sounds rather odd for a number of reasons. First of
to indicate to you if those people are before the all, it is incredible that anyone should have actually
police, but you can have that information of course. been sending these out and, secondly, it seems rather
Chairman: It can come to us in conﬁdence any odd that they should have sent them presumably to
way.17 their competitors. It sounds as if they were trying to
give their competitors an advantage on how to
defraud the system. Do we know who was doing it?
Mr Bacon (Mr Lauener) It was this chain of events that led to
the decision on 23 November to close the scheme256. If you could do that on a scale, the number of
immediately. On 21 November, which was athem getting a million pounds a week and the
Wednesday, we got evidence from a provider thatnumber getting £500,000 a week and so on, down to
account numbers were being circulated by a thirdabout £100,000 a week, that would be ﬁne.
party.We sent someone to interview the provider the
next day on the Thursday, we got the evidence in the16 Ev 29–30. Conﬁdential note provided, not printed.
17Note by witness:No provider received more then £1million in
18 Conﬁdential note provided, not printed.any one week. Conﬁdential note provided, not printed.
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form of a disk which had live account numbers, we because of the business processes which had been
implemented to develop and translate the policy intointerrogated the database to establish that these
account numbers were indeed live and in the course practice—and we have heard today some of the
drivers for that, the low bureaucracy, easy access—itof the day we had discussions with Mr Normington,
with ministers, discussions with the police and we meant that there was a lack of integrity within the
whole scheme rather than the IT system itself. I thinkdecided that the evidence was so strong that we
should close the scheme that day and I phoned Mr it is important to recognise that. Indeed, we identiﬁed
those problems continually throughout the wholeAldridge at half past four and made arrangements
for that to happen. period of executing and delivering the service and
much of what we have heard today,matters onwhich(Mr Aldridge) I think I would like to add to that if
we were in discussion, admittedly now at anI could. It is an important point which has come out
inappropriate level with colleagues from thequite late here. I will ask my colleague to talk about
Department.the IT security side. There is no evidence that the
system was being hacked into by any people outside
of the closed community of learning providers and
those who had signed up for Individual Learning Mr Rendel
Accounts, there is no evidence. There is no evidence, 265. I want to come back to the original question.also, that anything occurred within the ILA centre We have talked a lot about the numbers which wereand that is accepted within the NAO Report. available. What the statement in 3.14 says is that oneMr Field: You did not have to hack in. It was so of the providers—may have been involved in theeasy to get the money anyway, you did not need to be circulation of instructions as to how to circumventsophisticated. the system. That sounds like a diVerent case from the
(Mr Normington) What was happening was once one you have just been talking about in the answer.
you were in, in the last days people were loading up What I would like to know is were there instructions
disks with names. going out as to how to commit fraud and, if so, do we
know now, because this indicates we did not know at
the time this report was drawn up, who was
Mr Rendel circulating the instructions and, if so, what has been
done about it?263. Anybody could be a provider anyway.
(Mr Aldridge) Mr Rendel, can I say, let us be quite (Mr Lauener) It was all part of the same process.
Once a provider was in the system the algorithm forclear, this was not easy to get into. It required, once
you were in, to have collusion probably by three or creating Individual Learning Account numbers was
being circulated and this was the particular thing thatfour training providers to make it happen. There is
evidence that in one of the providers it took 23 hours added credence to the story about the disk that we
had in our hands and led us to conclude thatand it was apparent from the management
information that was produced by the system this although no-one was hacking into the system, the
integrity of the system was obviously in some doubtwas the case. One of those providers actually was on
the system for 1,332 times. He registered 8,568 and under attack from the providers that were
authorised to use it. There was evidence of certainlycourses whichwas an average of something like 1,223
courses a day, and his previous averagewas 54. It was one provider circumventing the system and one of
the providers had links with several other of thevery apparent this was not something where you
could simply go in and do things in the way that has 266. So you did know who that provider was who
been suggested. I think that is very important. was circulating the instructions?
(MrLauener)We know the names of the very small
number of providers that were involved in usingChairman account numbers in this way.
264. Did you want to say something, Mr Tizard? 267. Have they been prosecuted?
(MrAldridge) Could I askMr Tizard to add to the (Mr Lauener) Our concern is being discussed withpoint about IT security. the police.
(Mr Tizard) If I try to anticipate what I think Mr Chairman: I think you have got one more question
Field was going to say. There is no evidence that any from Mr Williams and then you are free to go.
Capita employee has misused or inappropriately
used data from the scheme. The events of the
weekend of the 18/19 November are it would appear Mr Williamsthat Provider A ran an automated script to detect
value of account holder numbers from within the 268. It is not one question, just one issue. Mr
Aldridge, you said in reply to Mr Davidson that yousystem. He passed those then to Provider B, so there
was collusion here between two providers at least, should have said more to the Permanent Secretary.
The Permanent Secretary has not featured muchwho tried to book courses for those account numbers
to check whether or not there was still credit today, only when I alluded to him a little earlier. In
the report, in all fairness, you gave considerableavailable on those accounts. Having established that
there was, he cancelled then those particular warnings to the Department about the problems that
you envisaged, so regardless of the fact that you saidbookings for those courses and passed that
information to a third, and maybe more providers you could have said more to the Permanent
Secretary, you did tell the Department. Was thewho then misused and abused the scheme. I think it
is important to recognise that the IT system had Permanent Secretary aware of the concerns that you
expressed and that you referred to in the report?integrity and was not breached by third parties but
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(Mr Aldridge) I do not think I can answer that. points within it and he needs the early warning of the
internal audit. What is your assessment of where it269. The old Permanent Secretary?
went wrong then as his successor? Why did they(MrNormington) I am not sure that the Permanent
miss it?Secretary was aware, no. I do not believe he was. I
(Mr Normington) I have had that conversationhave not had that particular conversation with him
with them.but from looking back at the history of this I do not
think that he was aware of that himself. 276. You have?
(Mr Normington) I have. All I can say is that270. As fraud was one of the hazards that has been
everybody involved in this, and in a sense this goesreferred to you would have expected possibly that
right back to the beginning, everybody believed thatsomebody in your Department would have said “By
this was an innovative scheme and they were going tothe way, although we do not think there is much
take some risks and those risks were justiﬁed becausedanger of fraud” one should have alerted him as
of the objective of getting many more people intoaccounting oYcer, because after all he was the
learning. The decision was taken therefore to haveaccounting oYcer, to the fact that it may be
not a rule free scheme but nevertheless a schemevulnerable to fraud.
which had light touch rules and the internal audit(Mr Normington) There are two issues here. In a
function observed that decision and did not believe itproperly run project you should have systems for
was the wrong decision. With retrospect, as I haveelevating problems to senior people and that did not
said, those were the wrong decisions but nobody inhappen. I have forgotten what the second point was
the systemwithin believed that it was a wrong course.but that is the main point I was going to make.
277. I am not asking names. We have been told an(Mr Lauener) Our assessment of the risk of fraud
individual is no longer in the department. Is thatwas not escalated up the senior management line but
from the internal audit section?we started oV with an assessment that there was low
probability and by October 2000 we had assessed (Mr Normington) No.
that it was medium and it was not exactly a stroke of 278. What about the internal audit section? They
genius but by the summer of 2001 we thought it was did not do the job that they were paid to do, what has
a high risk. It was not that we just sat back and made happened to them?
no reassessment. (Mr Normington) I think we have to hold
(Mr Normington) The other check that the responsible those who ran the scheme. The internal
Permanent Secretary would have as accounting audit are there to provide independent assurance.
oYcer was if his own internal audit alerted him to They did not do it in this case in a way that would
problems and they did not. have said there was a problem. Generally I have a lot
of conﬁdence in my internal audit. I get quarterly271. That is interesting. Should they have? Would
you have expected it? reports. We discuss it. They ﬂag things up to me
normally. This one they seem to have missed.(Mr Normington) They did not.
279. Does that make you nervous?272. That is not what I asked you. You said they
did not and I am asking would you have expected (Mr Normington) Yes.
them to? Mr Williams: I think you and Sir John had better
have a good conversation at leisure nextweek. Thank(Mr Normington) Yes.
you very much.273. You would?
Chairman: Thank you, gentlemen, for coming(Mr Normington) Yes. If they had spotted serious
before us this afternoon. My colleague, Gerryproblems in the project I would have expected them
Steinberg, said by virtue of saying sorry repeatedlyto have reported directly to the accounting oYcer. I
you have got away with murder. I do not think youam clear that they did not do that.
have got away with murder, I think it has been a very
274. Sir John, it is a matter of deep concern to the useful session. I think you have been open with us
NAO. You are dependent in part on the work of the about the shortcomings in the Department and you
internal audit in all departments, you have to have given us assurances that lessons have been
monitor the whole of Government, and it would be learnt. One of the lessons, of course, is that the
inﬁnitely more diYcult if the situation described was Accounting OYcer is ultimately responsible and has
fairly commonplace. What on earth went wrong that to be kept fully informed of what is going on and
the internal audit missed the dangers? there must be a genuine partnership with a
(Sir John Bourn) In the absence of being able to ask contractor. Obviously in this case it would have
them it is diYcult to go beyond the explanations helped if Capita had been on the board. Mr Aldridge
given by the Permanent Secretary as to why the has told us that he is the quiet man of business but I
Department as a whole were not cognisant of the real cannot believe he has built up a business by being a
risks that they were running in this matter. Having quiet man but, still, leave that to one side. I am sure
said that, of course, you do expect the internal audit you have learnt some lessons from this as well. I hope
to be able to stand slightly to one side of the that we will not see a situation again where civil
Department even though they are part of the servants feel that they are faced with a situation in
executive management. The point you make about which clearly pilot schemes are going wrong but they
my concern about it is well taken and I shall look feel they have to deliver something, even on an
into it. inadequate scheme, and ignore advice to meet a
timetable. Thank you very much for coming to see us275. It is fairly diYcult for an accounting oYcer.
this afternoon.He has a vast department himself that he has to try
to control with all manner of individual accounting
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APPENDIX 1
Supplementary memorandum submitted by Mr David Normington CB, Permanent Secretary, Department for
Education and Skills
Questions 80–83: Do you think that KPMG eliminated risk from that public sector comparator then? What you
seem to be now saying is that Capita had no price in there for risk because the risk was not spread to them, really?
Many of the risks of operating the ILA scheme did, in eVect, remain with the Department; but not all.
KPMG evaluated the Capita bid over the period January toMarch 2000. The analysis was consolidated into
a bid evaluation report (covering ﬁnancial, commercial and technical viability and sensitivity analysis) for the
Department in July 2000. The Public Sector Comparator (PSC) model was used to test the price and cost
information provided by Capita. The evaluation included the level of risk that Capita were assuming.
A high risk element for both the public and private sector was that this was a new service, with some
uncertainty about volumes, with Capita having little control over the demand risk because the onus for
stimulating demand rested with the Department. Other risks carried by Capita are as set out below:
— Delivery of the technical solution to very tight timescales.
— Potential delay of full service commencement due to failure to fulﬁl transition plan (as a result of
contractor default).
— Developing the business processes and systems to handle those.
— Service provision (eg web usage, call length and call volumes).
— Capacity to support demand levels and performance standards based on capacity limits.
— Inﬂation.
With hindsight, however, there was insuYcient clarity in areas where risks were shared between Capita and
the Department.
Questions 150–151: Can I ask in terms of prosecutions that have taken place...can you clarify what the penalty
was in those cases and what the scale of the oVence was?
The Department’s SIU is currently dealing with 153 registered learning providers about whom we have
more serious complaints or concerns. Of these 153, the police are investigating 100 learning providers. To
date there have been 60 arrests, which have resulted in 10 people accepting cautions and charges being
brought against 14 individuals. Charges have since been dropped against two individuals investigated by the
National Crime Squad (NCS); this was due to the small amounts of money involved for these individuals. 11
others are awaiting court appearances. One person has been convicted.
Questions 191–193: Mr Normington, could you say how much money from this scheme went to animal rights
extremists? Is it correct when the managing director of Huntingdon Life Sciences was attacked by animal rights
extremists a large wadge of Individual Learning Account application forms were found in the back of his car?
The ILA learning providers that police investigations have linked to Animal Rights activity are being
investigated by the NCS. Charges have been made against three providers. Details have been provided
separately to the Committee.
The NCS expects 10 people to appear in court in February on charges of deception and conspiracy.
One of the four people arrested in connection with the assault on the Managing Director of Huntington
Life Sciences was discovered to have four ILA application forms in his car. The individual was not
subsequently charged for the assault, but the discovery of the ILA application forms led to the NCS’s
investigation into ILA fraud. The NCS has no evidence to suggest that funds obtained from the ILA
programme have been used to support animal rights activities.
Questions 213–214: West Mercia Police have told me that they are sitting on a lot of ﬁles that they do not know
what to do with because there is no case to answer. Could you let us know in a note what advice you have had
from West Mercia Police about this?
The Department andWest Mercia police refute allegations that they are “sitting on a lot of cases that they
do not know what to do with because there is no case to answer”. West Mercia Police have conﬁrmed that
they have received a complaint in relation to only one ILA fraud and that they are involved in liaison with
the Department and Capita on this. The police have stated categorically that they are not “sitting on ﬁles that
they do not know what to do with”. A number of other learning providers have been linked to the allegation
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made to West Mercia and the Department’s SIU is in the process of collecting evidence on their behalf by
way of a mailshot to account holders. The Department is currently in the process of arranging a meeting to
hand over the results of this work.
Questions 227: Could we have a note on the successes [of working with Capita]?
At the time of the original ILA contracting process, Capita demonstrated that they had previously
implemented—with success—sensitive, high proﬁle political initiatives using controlled project management
techniques. For example, they had successfully developed and implemented the national nursery voucher
scheme for theDepartment for Education and Employment (DfEE), and also introduced the national driving
theory test for the Driving Standards Agency involving 1.5 million candidates per annum. DfEE had also
contracted with Capita in 1996 to administer the Teachers’ Pensions Scheme, and that contract was being
performed in line with contractual requirements. Over the contract’s seven year life it is expected to deliver
savings of £20 million.
Questions 245–254: Could you give us a note on all of the expenditure setting it out rather more clearly: what
you have paid to Capita so far, the various scenarios you will be paying and so on?
The ILA budget for England (£199 million over the two years 2000–01 and 2001–02 which includes DfES
budget allocations and £112.6 million recycled TEC resources) was based on achieving 1 million Individual
Learning Accounts by April 2002. Spend to date (as at 31 December 2002) has been £276.9 million following
the high level of take up of ILAs. Note, the budget ﬁgure is slightly lower than mentioned previously; mainly
reﬂecting a lower estimate for TEC recycled resources.
Following our decision to take forward the further development of ILAs as part of the wider review of the
funding of adult learning and the development of the wider National Skills Strategy, we agreed with Capita
that their work with us on the successor scheme was complete. We agreed with Capita that it was sensible to
terminate our contract with them for the ILA 1 programme. The negotiations on the contract termination
are now completed. The agreement on the settlement of the contract involved a ﬁnal payment by the
Department to Capita of £1.5 million. This payment is some £1 million less than Capita’s contractual
entitlement. The settlement payment brings the total spend on the Capita contract, included in the ﬁgures
above, to some £32.5 million (ex VAT), compared with a total contract value for the full 5 year term of some
£55 million.
Details of programme expenditure are set out below:
ILA Expenditure on National Delivery
£ million Income Expenditure
DfES Budgets Incentives for Delivery costs Policy Total (3) Forecast for
& TEC training (2)—Capita development/ ﬁnal outturn
contributions contract programme and overspend
for ILAs (1) support
(consultancy/
evaluation)
2000–01 70.0 51.8 15.6 2.6 70.0 70.0
2001–02 129.0 183.1 20.5 1.1 204.7 222.6
2002–03 NIL 0.2 1.5 0.5 2.2
Total 199.0 235.1 37.6 4.2 276.9 292.6
Budget 199.0 199.0 199.0
Overspend 77.9 93.6
Notes:
(1) Includes the TECs’ contributions to the budget for ILAs delivered by the national framework, ie after
deducting cost of locally delivered ILAs.
(2) In 2000–01 some ILAs were delivered by a unit set up by TECs in the South-East. Figure includes
£264,000 in management fees in 2000–01. (2000–01 and 2001–02—VAT inclusive).
(3) Payments at 31 December 2002.
minutes of evidence taken beforeEv 30
4 November 2002] [Continued
In addition, from Departmental running costs some £1.3 million has been spent on staV costs for those
involved in the winding-up of the original scheme.
David Normington CB
Permanent Secretary
Department for Education and Skills
December 2002
APPENDIX 2
Supplementary memorandum submitted by the National Audit OYce
The involvement of project providers on PPP project boards
The NAO made enquiries with Partnerships UK, the OYce of Government Commerce, and Capita. Our
ﬁndings support Mr Normington’s assertion that it was not standard practice for project providers to be on
project boards at the time the ILA partnership was established in 2000, and we found no examples of their
occurrence at that time. Guidance at the time did not emphasise the importance of this issue. More recently
the use of joint boards or teams has been promoted widely, and is becoming more common. The changing
emphasis of guidance is set out below.
In the Cabinet OYce’s 1994 report on the Government’s use of external consultants it states that
“throughout the project will be close collaboration between the organisations staV and the consultants. On
some projects this may simply mean the project manager keeping alongside the consultants . . . on others
a joint team will be set up”. The original Treasury Task Force guidance on partnerships (Partnerships for
Prosperity), issued in 1997, concentrates on the procurement stage of the process and pays little attention to
the contractmanagement/partnership stage, with nomention of project boards. Subsequent guidance on how
to manage and deliver long term PFI contracts, issued in January 2000, states that “it may be advisable to
establish a formal liaison committee with membership comprising representatives of the Authority, the
contract manager, the public sector end user or service client if separate, and the Contractor.”
The Institute for Public Policy Research’s 2001 publication on building better partnerships gives one case
example of its use (Capita/Norfolk County Council) and seems to welcome greater consideration of such
boards, along with other forms of “post-contractual governance arrangements”. Current OYce of
Government Commerce (OGC) best practice guidance, published in July 2001, on managing partnership
arrangements states that “to monitor progress and reduce the potential for conﬂict, top management must
ensure that a joint review and improvement team is established.”
APPENDIX 3
Supplementary memorandum submitted by Capita Group Plc
Introduction
1. Capita welcomes the opportunity to submit this memorandum of supplementary evidence. This
complements the oral evidence given by Capita’s Executive Chairman and Director of Policy and Public
AVairs at the Committee’s meeting on 4 November 2002.
2. Capita regrets that such an innovative and creative scheme has had to be stopped with the resultant
losses for learning providers, lost training opportunities for learners and such high levels of fraud and
inappropriate use of public money.
3. Capita wishes to contribute to all inquiries into the scheme and identiﬁcation of the lessons arising from
it, as well as with the current criminal and other investigations which are being undertaken.
4. Capita believes the shortcomings of the ILA scheme hold lessons for all future public private
partnership schemes.
Capita’s Role and Responsibilities
5. Capita administered speciﬁc elements of the ILA scheme, in accordance with the speciﬁcation and
business rules set by the DfES.
6. Capita’s role in the administration of the system and elements of the scheme in England was to:
— process account holder applications and issue membership forms via a call centre
— process learning provider registration applications at an administration centre
— produce a “claim for incentive payments” ﬁle for each learning provider for approval by the DfES
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— issue forms for membership cards and account holder “welcome packs” via a subcontractor called
Standard Group which operated under Capita’s direction
— develop, implement and operate the computer system in accordance with the DfES requirements to
support these processes via Capita Group’s Data Centre
— allow access to the computer systems by approved learning providers approved in accordance with
the Department’s Business Rules Handbook so that they could register account holder applications
for learning and conﬁrm commencement and hence a claim for the appropriate level of incentive
payment
— produce management information and audit reports to the DfES to agreed formats and agreed
schedules
— undertake the responsibilities of Data Processor as deﬁned in the Data Protection Act.
7. Capita was not responsible:
(i) for the decisions not to:
verify or accredit learning providers
verify that account holders have received learning for which provider payments have been claimed
and/or made
evaluate the quality of the learning,
(ii) under the contract for:
making the payments to the learning providers—this was undertaken by the DfES;
pursuing fraud enquiries directly—though Capita passed on any suspicion evidence of abuse or
fraud to the DfES.
8. The DfES retained responsibility for:
— determining policy and the composition of the project board (the Department chose not to include
Capita in the project board, thereby seriously diminishing the opportunity for their private partner
to inﬂuence the decisions made);
— setting the business rules and processes including quality assurance of the learning and learning
providers;
— ensuring the veriﬁcation or accreditation of learning providers (although the Department chose to
drop this activity in order to attract larger numbers of new learning providers and so grow the
market);
— making and authorising payments to learning providers;
— monitoring the performance and eVectiveness of the scheme (Capita provided management
information to the DfES to support this);
— client monitoring and management of the contract with Capita; and
— undertaking the responsibilities of Data Controller as deﬁned in the Data Protection Act.
9. Although this was meant to be public private partnership the DfES chose, as the National Audit OYce
report found, to treat Capita as a contractor and excluded Capita from the project board. This meant that
the DfES was unable to beneﬁt from Capita’s operational expertise and experience as would be standard in
good partnership arrangements. Capita sought membership of the project board on several occasions, but
was denied this. (C&AG’s Report para 2.23.)
10. An oYcial who was not a member of the project board, and who reported to a member of the board,
managed the contract relationship between Capita and the Department. Escalation of concerns was diYcult
because of these arrangements.
11. In Capita’s view, this lack of partnership was a fundamental cause of the problems that arose. It
prevented risk transfer to Capita and prevented Capita from having the opportunity to escalate swiftly
concerns, which it identiﬁed as the scheme was implemented and after it became operational.
12. Capita accepts that it should have circumvented the contract management arrangements and
relationships put in place by the Department, and that it should have made attempts to raise its increasing
concerns about the integrity and progress of the ILA scheme with senior DfES oYcials and Ministers.
13. Capita is so concerned about the impact of a lack of eVective partnership between client and provider
that it would have to seriously consider whether it would be appropriate to bid for any future central
Government contract unless the partnership arrangements are changed, demonstrating commitment and
capacity within the procuring department.
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Major Issues
Policy and Business Processes
14. It should be noted that although the original target was to have been 1million learning account holders
by March 2001, by the time the scheme was suspended in November 2001 there were in excess of 2.5 million
account holders—the vast majority of which were legitimate. The scheme also led to the development of the
learning provider supply market and to market diversity. This was an indication of the value of the scheme
and the importance that people were attaching to learning and training.
15. Capita was selected as the service provider for elements of the ILA scheme as a result of a competitive
procurement process. Although the set up period was challengingly short, Capita was able to ensure that the
scheme was operational in accordance with the Department’s timetable. Capita had existing infrastructure
and expertise in successfully setting up major schemes such as this one to tight timetables. For example,
Capita established the Theory Driving test within six months.
16. Immediately prior to and in the early weeks of the operation of the scheme, the DfES made some
changes to the original business rules for which the ICT system had been designed to support. These included
the dropping of requirements for validation of learning providers, and authenticating the addresses of
account applicants. These changes weakened the integrity of the overall ILA scheme.
17. The lack of veriﬁcation of account holders’ addresses make it easier for illegitimate multiple
applications. Capita brought these to DfES attention seven days after the start of the scheme in September
2001, but was told by the Department that it was a low priority.
18. The Department, in response to requests from learning providers, introduced “blank” application
forms. Originally learners had been expected to apply for membership by contacting the ILA centre and then
receiving a partly completed form. Capita was concerned that the use of these “blank” forms could lead to
abuse of the ILA scheme. Capita raised these concerns throughout the contract, and especially in April and
June 2001 when the level of activity increased signiﬁcantly.
19. Capita kept logs of all activity on the system, but did not have the controls to prevent or detect unusual
behaviour as it occurred, as the NAO Report rightly ﬁnds. It goes on to state that Capita had requested the
Department to consider such a control as a matter of priority, but that the DfES decided against pursuing it
at that time (C&AG’s Report para 2.49)
20. Capita regularly provided the Department with a range of management information on service
provision, as required and speciﬁed by the DfES. According to the NAO Report, the Department did not
have the capacity to study and act upon this information. (NAO Report card 3)
The IT System and Scheme Security
21. The failings in the integrity of the ILA scheme resulted from the policy and business rules on which
the overall ILA scheme was based, and not from any inherent insecurity in the IT system.
22. The computer and associated IT systems that Capita implemented were discussed and agreed with the
Department and its advisors. They were designed to enable access for a closed community of learning
providers for legitimate purposes, using an individual User ID and a password, in accordance with the
Department’s policy.
23. The IT system met contemporary industry standards—ISO/IEC 17799:2000.
24. Capita expected existing databases would be used to accredit learning providers and the learning
courses they oVered. The DfES chose not to do this. The Department subsequently proposed that learning
providers would be a closed community of learning providers. Without prior accreditation, all learning
providers were therefore placed in a position of trust in relation to the quality and appropriateness of learning
they oVered, and the way in which they could claim incentive payments for providing learning. Capita raised
this with the DfES as a concern.
25. The ILA Account Holder number was designed as a membership number, based on a sequential
number plus a check digit, in accordance with the ILApolicy and business rules and not as a securitymeasure.
26. The issuing of account statements to account holderswould have provided an additional security check
for the scheme. Originally these were meant to be issued annually, but the Department delayed their use in
July 2001. Capita also suggested that statements be issued on amore regular basis as ameans of ensuring that
account holders would be able to conﬁrm that they had received training for which payments were being
made. An additional security check was that payment would be authorised by and transferred from the DfES
following its approval of the claims for each learning provider.
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27. On 24 October 2001, the Secretary of State for Education and Skills, Estelle Morris MP, announced
the suspension of the ILA scheme in England due to the requirement to assess value for money and concerns
about the promotion and sales practices of some learning providers, and not due to concerns about the IT
system.
28. On 23 November, the DfES informed Capita that there was an allegation that account holders’
information was being put up for sale, and that a Capita employee might be implicated. Capita immediately
complied with the DfES’ instruction to close the system in order to protect the public interest and to allow
for the necessary investigations, which initially focussed on this incident.
29. There is no evidence that any Capita employee was involved in any inappropriate access to the system
or in supplying any account holder information improperly or illegally to a third party. (NAO para 3.8)
30. There is no evidence of any security breach of, or “hacking” into, the system by a third party who did
not have legitimate access to the system.
31. The actions to extract large numbers of names took place during November 2001 just prior to the
scheme closedown. Providers had already been notiﬁed that the scheme would be shut down, resulting in a
high access rate to the system to record and conﬁrm mainly legitimate activity.
32. It would appear that in one weekend in November 2001, account holder details were obtained by an
elaborate and inappropriate use of the system by at least three accredited learning providers, acting in
collusion.
33. Learning providers had access to account holders’ names and addresses for the legitimate purpose of
verifying that they had credit in their ILA and that they were registered learners in accordance with the
business rules.
Conclusion
34. Capita recognised the value and importance of the programme and was pleased to have the
opportunity to support the Government’s policy of Individual Learning Accounts through the development,
implementation and operation of the IT system and the administration of the deﬁned business processes.
35. Capita’s investigations have produced no evidence of any improper or illegal activity by any Capita
employee, or any unauthorised access to the scheme. Capita continues to co-operate with all the
investigations and inquiries on the ILA scheme. Capita made a range of evidence and information available
to the NAO.
36. Capita would be pleased to supply any further information that the Committee may require.
37. Capita believes there are clear lessons from what has occurred:
(i) Any public private partnership must be a true partnership: private partners must be members of the
project board, which should comprise senior personnel from the procurer and the provider partners.
They must also have access above board level to ensure the scheme beneﬁts from their advice and
expertise, and that any arising issues can be swiftly escalated, if necessary to senior oYcials and
ministers, and so resolved.
(ii) Whenever policy or business rules are changed, there should be consultation with the service delivery
partner, and the full implications of these changes on the security of the project and the IT system
should be identiﬁed and taken into account.
APPENDIX 4
Correspondence from Mr Ivan Lewis MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Adult Learning and
Skills, to the Chairman of the Committee
Capita contract termination settlement
The Department’s Accounts
I wrote to you on 24 October 2002 to advise you of our decision that the further development of the ILA
Successor Schememust form a coherent part of the future funding of adult learning, and that we had reached
an agreement with Capita that their current work on the development of a successor scheme was complete.
We agreed with Capita that it was sensible to terminate our current contract with them for the ILA
programme. The basis of the decision to terminate the contract was the change in Government policy about
the approach to the further development of the ILA successor scheme. At the PAC hearing on 4 November,
David Normington explained that discussions were on-going about the termination of the contract. Those
negotiations are now completed.
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The contractual position on termination takes into account:
— termination charges due to Capita under the contract,
— the return of part of the proﬁts generated by Capita to the Department under the contract Beneﬁt
Sharing arrangements; and
— that the Department has made no payments to Capita since April 2002 and very little had been paid
since closure of the original programme.
We and Capita have acknowledged that we have both made mistakes in the way the original programme
was operated. The agreement on the settlement of the ILA contract involves a ﬁnal payment by the
Department to Capita of £1.5 million. The settlement will bring the total spend on the contract to around
£32.5 million (ex VAT), compared with a total contract value for the full 5 year term of some £55 million.
The ﬁnal settlement payment is some £1 million less than Capita’s contractual entitlement—this ﬁgure was
mutually agreed through negotiation to reﬂect a settlement acceptable to both parties based on Capita’s
delivery of the ILA system and the shared desire to conclude the wind down of the original scheme.
Capita worked closely with theDepartment on the wind down of the ILAprogramme and also in the initial
work on developing arrangements for a successor scheme. Their work has helped to provide us with a
framework on which we can now move forward.
As part of the settlement, Capita will continue to provide support on the ILA wind down work until April
2003. Capita have also agreed that the Department will be able to draw fully on the investment in the design
and development work undertaken by Capita over the term of the contract to date—both the system for the
original ILA Programme and the work undertaken by Capita with us on the initial development of a
successor scheme.
I am taking this opportunity to inform the Committee that the Department’s Annual Accounts will soon
be published. These will record that there were estimated net irregular payments of £97 million on the ILA
programme of which, based on estimates and extrapolations, some £67 million was fraud and serious
irregularities. The other £30 million was were learning was provided but where the claims did not fully meet
the programmes rules.
Ivan Lewis
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Adult Learning and Skills
20 January 2003
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